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If the only tool you have is a hammer, you tend to see every 
problem as a nail.  
—Abraham Maslow1 
 
Henry Ward Beecher once observed, “Laws and institutions 
are constantly tending to gravitate. Like clocks, they must be 
occasionally cleansed, and wound up, and set to true time.”2 As 
law, societies, and governments evolve, challenging transitional 
periods inevitably arise, requiring reexamination of the bedrock 
upon which a system was founded. 
Dispute resolution systems exhibit a similar phenomenon. 
As a system develops and undergoes fundamental growth, re-
consideration of its efficacy can promote both the integrity and 
the legitimacy of the system to ensure it provides appropriate 
services to its stakeholders.3 The resolution of international in-
vestment disputes is a salient example of this maxim. 
International investment law has experienced significant 
growth. Within the last two decades, the number of interna-
 
 1. See ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE 15–16 
(1996). 
 2. HENRY WARD BEECHER, LIFE THOUGHTS 129 (Sheldon & Co. 1866) 
(1858). 
 3. The birth and growth of the “Alternative Dispute Resolution” move-
ment—with its focus on the multi-door courthouse and development of non-
traditional dispute resolution mechanisms—is an example of this phenome-
non. See LEONARD L. RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 12–
62 (3d ed. 2005); see also Warren E. Burger, Isn’t There a Better Way?, 68 
A.B.A. J. 274, 276–77 (1982) (discussing developments in arbitration and other 
alternatives to court); Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 
F.R.D. 111, 111–12 (1976) (noting that increased pressure on the court system 
would likely prompt the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms); cf. 
Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1073–75 (1984) (tracing 
the development of alternative dispute resolution while questioning the value 
of settlement). The area continues to evolve. See Christopher Honeyman & 
Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Introduction to THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK: THE 
DESK REFERENCE FOR THE EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR 1, 2 (Andrea Kupfer 
Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006) [hereinafter NEGOTIATOR’S 
FIELDBOOK] (considering dispute resolution from an interdisciplinary perspec-
tive); INST. ON CONFLICT RESOL. & SOC’Y OF PROF’LS IN DISPUTE RESOL., DE-
SIGNING INTEGRATED CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: GUIDELINES FOR 
PRACTITIONERS AND DECISION MAKERS IN ORGANIZATIONS (2001), available at 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001& 
context=icrpubs (suggesting that, as the process of evaluating dispute resolu-
tion evolves, there is an increased emphasis on creating integrated conflict 
management systems); James R. Coben, Intentional Conversations About the 
Globalization of ADR, 27 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 217, 222 (2006) (refer-
ring to scholarship that suggests a need to reconsider conflict management in 
light of the evolution of dispute systems). 
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tional investment treaties, which provide foreign investors with 
substantive rights and procedural remedies, has surged to 
nearly 2500.4 Meanwhile, foreign investment spiked to levels 
over $1 trillion,5 and foreign investors have brought vital capi-
tal and know-how to countries in need of basic infrastructure 
like clean water, paved roads, electricity, and telecommunica-
tions.6 While these investments can benefit both investors and 
 
 4. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. [UNCTAD], BILATERAL IN-
VESTMENT TREATIES IN THE MID-1990S at 10, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7, 
U.N. Sales No. E.98.II.D.8 (1998) [hereinafter UNCTAD, BITs] (observing the 
surge in the number of investment treaties during the 1990s); UNCTAD, De-
velopments in International Investment Agreements in 2005, 2, IIA MONITOR, 
No. 2 2006, at 1, 2, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2006/7, http://www 
.unctad.org/en/docs/webiteiia20067_en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD, Interna-
tional Investment Agreements] (finding that, by the end of 2005, there were 
2495 bilateral investment treaties); see also Susan D. Franck, Foreign Direct 
Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and the Rule of Law, 19 PAC. 
MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 337, 338 (2007) (explaining that the 
number of investment treaties has tripled in the past two decades). But see 
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
PERSPECTIVES: 2006, at 144 (2006) (suggesting that the number of interna-
tional investment agreements actually in force and effect is around seventeen 
hundred); UNCTAD, The Entry into Force of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BITs), IIA MONITOR, No. 3 2006, at 1, 2–3, U.N. Doc. UN-
CTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2006/9, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webiteiia20069_en 
.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD, Entry into Force] (acknowledging that, out of the 
2495 investment treaties in existence at the end of 2005, only 75.8% had en-
tered into force). 
 5. See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT & COLUMBIA PROGRAM ON INT’L 
INV., WORLD INVESTMENT PROSPECTS TO 2010: BOOM OR BACKLASH? 6 (Laza 
Kekic & Karl P. Sauvant eds., 2006), available at http://www.cpii.columbia 
.edu/pubs/documents/WIP_to_2010_SPECIAL_EDITION.pdf [hereinafter 
WORLD INVESTMENT PROSPECTS] (indicating that levels of foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) in 2006 are approximately $1165 billion and expected to grow 
to $1407.3 billion by 2010); Franck, supra note 4, at 338 (indicating that FDI 
surged from $200 billion in 1990 to over $1 trillion in 2000). But see UNCTAD, 
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2006 at xvii, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2006, 
U.N. Sales No. E.06.II.D.11 (2006), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ 
wir2006_en.pdf (suggesting that the level of FDI in 2005 was $916 billion, but 
noting that the peak in 2000 was $1.4 trillion). FDI in member states of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reached 
$622 billion in 2005, which was a twenty-seven percent increase since 2004. 
OECD, supra note 4, at 15. 
 6. Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights Un-
der Investment Treaties: Do Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future, 12 U.C. 
DAVIS. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 47, 48–49 (2005); see also PAUL E. COMEAUX & N. 
STEPHAN KINSELLA, PROTECTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT UNDER INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, at xvii, xxv (1997) (discussing the vital contributions made by 
foreign investment, including important contributions for local entrepreneurs, 
the provision of an integrated package of financial backing and skills, the in-
troduction of competitive enterprises, the adoption of new management tech-
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host states, there are latent tensions between the two groups 
when their interests diverge. When this unaddressed tension 
encounters an appropriate catalyst, disputes can result.7 
Unsurprisingly, where conflict has festered, foreign inves-
tors have used their new treaty rights to bring claims against 
host governments. Perhaps less expected, however, is the num-
ber and magnitude of disputes arising under investment trea-
ties.8 Some have referred to this as a “litigation explosion”9 
where billions of dollars and sovereignty are at stake.10 
 
niques, and the catalyst for new opportunities). 
 7. See infra notes 101–06 and accompanying text (discussing examples of 
investment treaty disputes). 
 8. Compare K. Scott Gudgeon, Avoidance and Settlement of International 
Investment Disputes, 78 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 38, 49 (1984) (“I expect that 
the BIT arbitration feature, even if it may not lead to a surge of business for 
arbitral fora, will assist investors in minimizing risks . . . [and] avoiding dis-
putes . . . .”), with George M. von Mehren et al., Navigating Through Investor-
State Arbitrations—An Overview of Bilateral Investment Treaty Claims, DISP. 
RESOL. J., Feb.–Apr. 2004, at 69, 76 (suggesting that the “number of global in-
vestors seeking to recoup losses through BIT arbitrations will increase in the 
coming years”). 
 9. UNCTAD, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES ARISING FROM INVESTMENT 
TREATIES: A REVIEW at 4–6, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/4, U.N. Sales 
No. E.06.II.D.1 (2005), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ 
iteiit20054_en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD, DISPUTES]; UNCTAD, Recent Devel-
opments in International Investment Agreements, IIA MONITOR, No. 2 2005, at 
1, 1–3, 13–15, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIT/2005/1, http://www.unctad 
.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/webiteiit20051_en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD, Re-
cent Developments]; Jeswald W. Salacuse, Explanations for the Increased Re-
course to Treaty-Based Investment Dispute Settlement: Resolving the Struggle 
of Life Against Form?, in COHERENCE AND CONSISTENCY IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW (Karl P. Sauvant ed., forthcoming 2007); see also Andrea 
Kupfer Schneider, Not Quite a World Without Trials: Why International Dis-
pute Resolution Is Increasingly Judicialized, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 119, 119 
(noting an “explosion” of international trials to resolve disputes that formerly 
would have been resolved through diplomacy); Gus Van Harten & Martin 
Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative 
Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 124 & n.11 (2006) (referring to the growth of in-
vestment treaty arbitration and noting that “ICSID arbitration is only part of 
the explosion”). 
 10. See Michael D. Goldhaber, Treaty Disputes: Arbitration Scorecard, 
FOCUS EUR., Summer 2007, at 22, 22–27, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/ 
tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?hubtype=Inside&id=1180947929487 (describing twen-
ty-five cases where the amount in controversy is over $1 billion per case and 
the total amount in dispute is over $103.77 billion); Charity L. Goodman, Un-
charted Waters: Financial Crisis and Enforcement of ICSID Awards in Argen-
tina, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 449, 452 (2007) (suggesting that there were at 
least thirty-four investment treaty claims against Argentina, which also de-
faulted on government debt in the order of $80 billion); PUBLIC CITIZEN, NAF-
TA’S THREAT TO SOVEREIGNTY AND DEMOCRACY: THE RECORD OF NAFTA 
CHAPTER 11 INVESTOR-STATE CASES 1994–2005, at vii–xxi (2005), http://www 
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The escalation in the availability and use of the treaty-
based dispute resolution process has led to a teething period. 
The boundaries of states’ previously untested international law 
obligations are being sketched, and parties and nonparties 
have cheered and jeered the efficacy, efficiency, and fairness of 
the current system for resolving investment treaty disputes.11 
In the United States, for example, there is an ongoing debate 
about the proper terms for investment treaties and the renewal 
of the Trade Promotion Authority Act.12 
With its fundamental growth13—and divergent views as to 
its success—the process of resolving investment treaty disputes 
 
.citizen.org/documents/Chapter%2011%20Report%20Final.pdf (detailing the 
rights of foreign investors to seek enforcement from governments under the 
North American Free Trade Agreement). But see W. Michael Reisman, Reflec-
tions on Economic Development, National Sovereignty and International Arbi-
tration 16–20 (Apr. 13, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at http:// 
www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Bogota.4.13.06.pdf) (observing that the con-
sent to arbitration is itself an exercise of sovereignty, suggesting that arbitral 
tribunals strictly apply the law, and commenting that countries can then take 
steps to accommodate concerns about sovereignty through the normal political 
process). 
 11. Compare Charles H. Brower, II, Structure Legitimacy and NAFTA’s 
Investment Chapter, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 37, 49–51, 77–81 (2003) (ex-
pressing concerns about the legitimacy of resolving investment disputes under 
NAFTA), Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbi-
tration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1582–83 (2005) (expressing concerns about the le-
gitimacy of resolution of investment treaty disputes generally), and Carlos G. 
Garcia, All the Other Dirty Little Secrets: Investment Treaties, Latin America, 
and the Necessary Evil of Investor-State Arbitration, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 301, 
338–46, 352–56 (2004) (exploring procedural deficiencies and costs of investor-
state arbitration), with Judith A.E. Gill, Inconsistent Decisions: An Issue to Be 
Addressed or a Fact of Life?, 2 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 12, 15 (2005) (sug-
gesting that concerns with the current arbitration system will be addressed 
over time), and Daniel M. Price, Chapter 11—Private Party vs. Government, 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Frankenstein or Safety Valve?, 26 CAN.-U.S. 
L.J. 107, 114 (2000) (suggesting that the system can handle some inconsisten-
cy and suggesting “fears about overreaching [arbitral] panels are quite prema-
ture”). 
 12. Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 3801–13 (West 2005 & Supp. 2007); see Lee Hudson Teslik, Fast-Track 
Trade Promotion Authority and Its Impact on U.S. Trade Policy, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS, June 25, 2007, http://www.cfr.org/publication/13663/ 
fasttrack_trade_promotion_authority_and_its_impact_on_us_trade_policy.htm
(discussing the debate about the renewal of Trade Promotion Authority Act). 
 13. Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment 
Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssrn 
.com/abstract=969257 (discussing the purported increase in the rise of invest-
ment treaty arbitration and offering data that demonstrate a marked increase 
in the number of arbitration awards). 
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is at a critical historical juncture that requires reexamination 
of its foundations. Given that treaties provide a set of legal 
rights and parties can now bargain with some information 
about where the shadow of the law may fall, it is time to think 
strategically about how to manage conflict effectively. 
In an effort to consider how best to examine the system’s 
efficacy to promote its long-term integrity, this Article consid-
ers two discrete areas—investment treaties and Dispute Sys-
tems Design—to suggest how they might inform each other.14 
Dispute Systems Design is not a form of dispute resolution or a 
type of “alternative dispute resolution.” Rather it is a process of 
analyzing existing patterns of disputing, creating new 
processes, and implementing and testing the new design in or-
der to create a process that effectively and efficiently resolves 
disputes.15 The central question this Article addresses is: Can 
and should Dispute Systems Design play a role in developing 
the processes for resolving investment treaty-related conflict? 
As this is the first scholarship to consider this intersection, 
the issues raised in this Article are tentative and calculated to 
encourage more systematic analysis.16 Part I introduces basic 
concepts related to investment treaties. Part II outlines the 
more general context of conflict resolution theory and Dispute 
Systems Design principles. Part III of the Article then demon-
strates how these related—but thus far distinct—areas might 
inform each other. It explores the potential application of Dis-
pute Systems Design principles to investment conflict and then, 
in Part IV, considers the costs and benefits of such an ap-
proach. Part IV also identifies key issues for this integration 
and recommends exploration of critical questions such as the 
identification of organizing principles for dispute resolution 
processes. 
 
 14. See Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Public and Private International Dis-
pute Resolution, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 438, 451 (Michael 
L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005) (discussing the value of interdiscip-
linary discussions and cross-fertilization between the international law and 
dispute resolution disciplines). 
 15. At its core, Dispute Systems Design is a systematic process of choosing 
a dispute resolution methodology. See infra notes 62–66 and accompanying 
text for a detailed definition and discussion of Dispute Systems Design. 
 16. There is scholarship that considers aspects of dispute resolution, such 
as improvements to investment treaty arbitration rules and nonbinding dis-
pute resolution processes. This literature is an important contribution, but it 
has not yet taken a systematic approach to diagnosing and managing conflict. 
See infra note 78 and accompanying text. 
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The Article concludes that this new area of scholarship 
should play a role in the effective and efficient management of 
investment treaty conflict. It then considers the next steps for 
implementing and diffusing Dispute Systems Design to develop 
processes to manage investment treaty conflict. Without a con-
sidered assessment and development of dispute resolution 
processes, the legitimacy of existing systems will continue to be 
questioned, and dispute resolution mechanisms might fail to 
harness the positive aspects of conflict while minimizing the 
negative ones. With Dispute Systems Design, stakeholders will 
be in a better position to maximize satisfaction and legitimacy 
of the dispute resolution process. 
I.  FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND INVESTMENT TREATIES   
A. THE ROLE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
Foreign investment has a critical impact on the world 
economy and development.17 In previous decades, foreign in-
vestment involved billions of dollars annually, and current pro-
jections suggest that investment inflows will be close to $1.5 
trillion by 2010.18 
While its definition is a subject of debate,19 foreign invest-
ment archetypically involves a large infrastructure project. It 
 
 17. See R. DOAK BISHOP ET AL., FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CASES, 
MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 2–7 (2005); II ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 435–37 (1995). 
 18. WORLD INVESTMENT PROSPECTS, supra note 5, at 6. 
 19. Professor Sornarajah defines foreign investment as “the transfer of 
tangible or intangible assets from one country into another for the purpose of 
use in that country to generate wealth under the total or partial control of the 
owner of the assets.” M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT 4 (1994) (footnotes omitted); see also COMEAUX & KINSELLA, su-
pra note 6, at xix–xx (“Foreign direct investment refers to direct control of ei-
ther assets or an enterprise in a foreign country through ownership of a sub-
stantial portion of the assets or enterprise.”). 
There is a debate about the definition of investment. Some scholars dis-
tinguish among direct investment projects where investors control the 
project’s development, portfolio investments that involve buying shares in the 
company, and cross-border trade in goods and services; others disagree with 
this approach. See SORNARAJAH, supra, at 4–8; Alfred Escher, Current Devel-
opments, Legal Challenges, and Definition of FDI, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOR-
EIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 3, 20–25 (Daniel D. Bradlow & Alfred Escher eds., 
1999) (considering the broad and narrow definitions of FDI and observing that 
the International Monetary Fund defines investment as “acquir[ing] a lasting 
interest in an enterprise operating in an economy”); see also II ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 435 (1995) (characterizing foreign investment 
as “the transfer of funds or materials from one country (called the capital ex-
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might range from something as basic as the construction of a 
road, the financing and development of a power plant, or the 
development of telecommunications capacity.20 Investment can 
be broader than this, however. Foreign investment also might 
involve intellectual property rights21 or other types of vital 
commercial activity.22 These basic investments can have pro-
found effects on the alleviation of global poverty and the promo-
tion of economic opportunities.23 
 
porting country) to another country (called the host country) to be used in the 
conduct of an enterprise in that country in return for a direct or indirect par-
ticipation in the earnings of the enterprise. . . . Foreign investment may con-
sist of ‘direct investment’ or ‘portfolio investment’. The distinguishing factor is 
the degree of managerial control acquired by the investor”). 
Irrespective of this debate, most investment treaties have a specific yet 
broad definition of “investment.” The 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment 
Treaty (BIT) defines investment, for example, as “every asset that an investor 
owns or controls, directly or indirectly . . . [including] (a) an enterprise; (b) 
shares, stock, and other forms of equity participation . . . ; (d) futures, options, 
and other derivatives; . . . (f ) intellectual property rights; . . . (h) other tangible 
or intangible, movable or immovable property, and related property rights, 
such as leases, mortgages, liens, and pledges.” Model Treaty Between the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America and the Government of [Country] 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-
[Country], art. 1, Feb. 5, 2004, http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Sectors/ 
Investment/Model_BIT/asset_upload_file847_6897.pdf [hereinafter 2004 U.S. 
Model BIT]. 
 20. See Joshua Robbins, The Emergence of Positive Obligations in Bilater-
al Investment Treaties, 13 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 403, 406–07 (2006) 
(outlining various scenarios involving foreign investment). 
 21. Ingo Selting, FDI and International Protection of Intellectual Property, 
in LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 19, at 205, 
205–06. 
 22. A synthesis of the current investment treaty case law might reasona-
bly suggest that services, construction, trade, and financial-related invest-
ments can qualify as investments under appropriate circumstances. See UN-
CTAD, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES [ICSID]: MODULE 2.5, 
REQUIREMENTS RATIONE MATERIAE 19–24 (2003), U.N. Doc. UN-
CTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.4 (prepared by Alejandro A. Escobar), in UNCTAD, 
COURSE ON DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ 
edmmisc232add4_en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT]. But 
see Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of Congo, No. ARB/99/7, Decision on the 
Application for Annulment of the Award (ICSID Nov. 1, 2006), http://ita.law 
.uvic.ca/documents/mitchellannulment.pdf (holding that there was insufficient 
evidence to conclude that a business providing legal services related to debt 
collection qualified as investment in part because it lacked a nexus with devel-
opment); UNCTAD, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, supra, at 17 (noting that the IC-
SID Secretariat refused to register a case because a supply contract for the 
sale of goods was not deemed to be a qualifying investment).  
 23. For example, the World Bank explains that “[b]uilding rural roads 
helps firms get their goods to market, and in Morocco also increased primary 
school enrollment from 28 to 68 percent.” WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOP-
FRANCK_6FMT 12/13/2007 9:08 AM 
170 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [92:161 
 
Because of its importance to development and economic 
prosperity, there is keen competition among developed and de-
veloping countries to attract foreign investment.24 Govern-
ments use various strategies at the national and sub-national 
levels to facilitate this objective.25 Some of these strategies 
might be straightforward, such as liberalizing an economic sec-
tor or providing tax incentives.26 Other strategies might be 
more complex, such as improving the court system or creating 
effective alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.27 
 
MENT REPORT 2005: A BETTER INVESTMENT CLIMATE FOR EVERYONE 4 (2004), 
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2005/Resources/ 
complete_report.pdf [hereinafter WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005]. 
 24. See Robert O. Keohane & Van Doorn Ooms, The Multinational Firm 
and International Regulation, 29 INT’L ORG. 169, 170 (1975) (“Almost every 
government in the world . . . attempts to entice foreign capital.”); Malcolm J. 
Rogge, Towards Transnational Corporate Accountability in the Global Econo-
my: Challenging the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in In Re: Union Car-
bide, Alfaro, Sequihua, and Aguinda, 36 TEX. INT’L L.J. 299, 314 (2001) 
(“[G]overnments in both rich and poor nations compete in a ‘race to the bottom’ 
to attract needed foreign investment.”). There is evidence that this competition 
is prevalent among developing countries. See Teresa Edwards, The Relocation 
of Production and Effects on the Global Community, 13 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y 183, 190 (2002) (“[G]overnments of these less-developed countries, 
in an effort to attract foreign investment, compete with one another to make 
their standards the most attractive to the investing companies.”); Lawrence 
Jahoon Lee, Barcelona Traction in the 21st Century: Revisiting Its Customary 
and Policy Underpinnings 35 Years Later, 42 STAN. J. INT’L L. 237, 266 (2006) 
(“[D]eveloping states compete with each other to attract foreign invest-
ment . . . .”). 
 25. See Thomas W. Soseman, International Law—The Exon-Florio 
Amendment to the 1988 Trade Bill: A Guardian of National Security or a Pro-
tectionist Weapon?, 15 J. CORP. L. 597, 603 (1990) (“[S]tate and city govern-
ments fiercely compete with each other to attract foreign investment.”). 
 26. The World Bank, for example, suggests that governments might pro-
vide fiscal incentives (like tax concessions or subsidies), improve domestic in-
frastructure, promote a skilled labor force, establish agencies to promote for-
eign investment, improve the regulatory environment, or enter into 
international agreements. See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005, supra 
note 23, at 7–13; World Bank, Policies to Attract Foreign Direct Investment, 
http://rru.worldbank.org/PapersLinks/ReadingList.aspx?topicid=10 (last vi-
sited Oct. 17, 2007); see also Paul J. Heald, Misreading a Canonical Work: An 
Analysis of Mansfield’s 1994 Study, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 309, 318 (2003) (cri-
tiquing empirical research suggesting the protection of intellectual property 
rights fosters investment). 
 27. Franck, supra note 4, at 340 (discussing how India and China are at-
tempting to improve their alternative dispute resolution systems as a tactic for 
fostering foreign investment). 
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B. INVESTMENT TREATIES 
While there is mixed empirical evidence as to its actual 
success in securing foreign investment, one popular tactic gov-
ernments use to promote foreign investment is signing an in-
vestment treaty.28 An investment treaty is an agreement made 
between two or more governments that safeguards investments 
made in the territory of other signatory countries.29 For exam-
ple, the United States and Ukraine might sign and ratify a bi-
lateral investment treaty.30 The United States must then pro-
vide a series of rights to Ukrainian investors investing in the 
United States. The reciprocal nature of the treaty means Unit-
ed States investors in the Ukraine will have those same rights. 
 
 28. While the stated goal of signing these international investment 
agreements is largely to increase foreign investment levels, empirical analyses 
are mixed as to whether treaties achieve that objective. See Franck, supra note 
6, at 48–51 (outlining the issue); Franck, supra note 4, at 348–53 (surveying 
the empirical literature, including studies by Hallward-Dreimer, Rose-
Ackerman and Tobin, UNCTAD, Salacuse and Sullivan, Neumayer and Spess, 
and Swenson, on the topic of how investment treaties affect foreign invest-
ment). 
 29. Franck, supra note 6, at 52. While these treaties typically take the 
form of BITs, an emerging trend is the creation of larger, multilateral invest-
ment treaties (MITs) or a larger trade agreement. See, e.g., Gary G. Yerkey, 
Bush’s Plan to Create Mideast Free Trade Area by 2013 Could Take Off This 
Year, BNA WTO REPORTER, Jan. 20, 2006, http://pubs.bna.com/NWSSTND/IP/ 
BNA/wto.nsf/SearchAllView/E06B2B933FB0617D852570FC00042923?Open&
highlight=BUSH’S,PLAN,TO,CREATE (discussing the possibility of Middle-
East trade and investment treaties). MITs like the North American Free 
Trade Agreement and Central American Free Trade Agreement function in 
the same way as BITs, but provide investment protection on a multilateral ba-
sis. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex. ch. 11, Dec. 17, 
1992, 107 Stat. 2057 [hereinafter NAFTA]; Dominican Republic-Central Amer-
ica-United States Free Trade Agreement ch. 10, Aug. 5, 2004, 119 Stat. 462, 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Regional/CAFTA/CAFTA-
DR_Final_Texts/Section_Index.html [hereinafter CAFTA-DR]; see also Anto-
nio R. Parra, Provisions on the Settlement of Investment Disputes in Modern 
Investment Laws, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Multilateral Instruments 
on Investment, 12 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 287, 290–95 (1997). MITs al-
so tend to address issues beyond investment protection and may address is-
sues such as rules of origin, customs obligations, sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures, and cross-border trade in services. See NAFTA, supra, chs. 4, 5, 7, 
15; CAFTA-DR, supra, chs. 4, 5, 7, 11. 
 30. There is a treaty between the United States and Ukraine. See Treaty 
Between the United States of America and Ukraine Concerning the Encour-
agement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Ukr., Mar. 4, 1994, S. 
TREATY DOC. NO. 103-37 (1994), available at http://www.unctad.org/ 
sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/us_ukraine.pdf. 
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By the end of 2005, there were at least 2495 investment 
treaties signed among at least 175 different countries.31 The 
proliferation of these investment treaties was a paradigm shift 
for both substantive and procedural investor rights. 
1. Substantive Rights 
Rather than relying on the contested meaning of certain 
international law standards, investment treaties articulate 
specific substantive investment rights.32 In essence, investment 
treaties provide foreign investors with an economic bill of rights 
from a host state.33 Typically, these rights include guarantees 
of appropriate compensation for expropriation, promises of 
freedom from unreasonable or discriminatory measures, guar-
antees of national treatment for the investment, assurances of 
fair and equitable treatment, promises that investments will 
receive full protection and security, undertakings that a sove-
reign will honor its obligations, and assurances that foreign di-
rect investment (FDI) will receive treatment no less favorable 
than that accorded under international law.34 At a basic level, 
investment treaties promise that host governments will not 
treat investors and their investments unreasonably.35 
2. Procedural Rights: Resolving Investment Treaty Disputes 
Investment treaties are not simply revolutionary because 
of the substantive protections that they provide. The real inno-
vation was the grant of procedural rights.36 These rights offered 
investors direct access to dispute resolution to redress their 
grievances against host governments. Rather than creating un-
 
 31. UNCTAD, DISPUTES, supra note 9; UNCTAD, Entry into Force, supra 
note 4; see also UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2004 at 221, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/WIR/2004, U.N. Sales No. E.04.II.D.33 (2004), available at http:// 
www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2004_en.pdf; supra note 4 and accompanying text 
(discussing the increase in the number of investment treaties). 
 32. See, e.g., Andrew Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: 
Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 
639, 641 (1998) (discussing the uncertainty and controversy surrounding stan-
dards for international expropriation, including the rise and fall of the Hull 
Rule).  
 33. Franck, supra note 6, at 48. 
 34. See RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT 
TREATIES 1–18 (1995); Giorgio Sacerdoti, Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral 
Instruments on Investment Protection, in RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED 
COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 298, 299 (1997). 
 35. Franck, supra note 4, at 342. 
 36. Id. 
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enforceable substantive rights or forcing investors to rely on 
their home governments to resolve disputes on their behalf, 
treaties provide a forum to redress alleged wrongs.37 Broadly 
speaking, in what amounts to a sophisticated choice-of-forum 
clause, investors have an opportunity to engage in nonbinding 
or binding dispute resolution.38 
II.  CONFLICT THEORY AND DISPUTE SYSTEMS DESIGN   
With imperfect human beings involved, conflict is inherent 
in foreign investment. Equipped with broad substantive rights 
and a forum to redress perceived wrongs, creative investors are 
testing the scope of their investment treaty rights.39 It is there-
fore useful to explore the general context of conflict resolution 
theory in order to understand the specific implications for in-
vestment treaty conflict.40 
A. CONFLICT THEORY 
In a classic formulation, conflict has been compared to wa-
ter.41 Both substances are neither inherently positive nor nega-
tive. Like water, conflict is necessary;42 but an overabundance 
or shortage of this resource can inhibit its potential positive 
force.43 
 
 37. See William S. Dodge, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Between De-
veloped Countries: Reflections on the Australia-United States Free Trade 
Agreement, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 5–14 (2006) (describing the evolution 
from diplomatic protection to treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Naviga-
tion to investment treaties); see also Franck, supra note 11, at 1525–29; infra 
Part III.C.1 (discussing historical methods of resolving investment disputes). 
 38. See infra section Part III.C.2 for a detailed discussion of the dispute 
resolution mechanisms typically available in investment treaties. 
 39. See infra notes 101–07 and accompanying text (discussing cases where 
foreign investors have brought claims against host governments). 
 40. See infra Part III.B for a more detailed discussion of the nature of in-
vestment treaty conflict. 
 41. William L. Ury, Foreword, in CATHY COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA 
SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE 
TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY ORGANIZATIONS, at xiii, xiii (1996). 
 42. See LEWIS COSER, FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT 15–31 (1956); 
MORTON DEUTSCH, THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT: CONSTRUCTIVE AND DE-
STRUCTIVE PROCESSES 8–10 (1973); MARY PARKER FOLLETT, Constructive Con-
flict, in DYNAMIC ADMINISTRATION: THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF MARY PARKER 
FOLLETT 30, 30–31 (Henry C. Metcalf & L. Urwick eds., 1940); DEAN PRUITT & 
SUNG HEE KIM, SOCIAL CONFLICT: ESCALATION, STALEMATE, AND SETTLE-
MENT 9–11 (3d ed. 2004). 
 43. See ALLAN J. STITT, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR ORGANI-
ZATIONS 3–4 (1998); John W. Burton, Conflict Resolution as a Political Philos-
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This notion of conflict applies equally in the context of in-
ternational investment.44 Conflict between foreign investors 
and host governments occurs when interests diverge and where 
parties are dissatisfied with an interaction, process, or substan-
tive result. Despite its traditional negative connotation, in-
vestment conflict can be positive.45 Managed conflict creates 
opportunities for commercial, social, and political innovation.46 
It may, for example, attract attention to important issues that 
require redress. Conflict can also lead to new insights and in-
novations by creating incentives to explore new ideas and de-
velop alternative solutions.47 It may also provide opportunities 
for more meaningful dialogue and the development of stronger 
relationships and greater levels of investment.48 
Imagine, for example, that a group of investment mavens49 
who have made a foreign investment in a new country, geo-
 
ophy, in CONFLICT RESOLUTION THEORY AND PRACTICE 55, 55–56 (Dennis J.D. 
Sandole & Hugo van der Merwe eds., 1993); Dennis J.D. Sandole, Paradigm, 
Theories, and Metaphors in Conflict and Conflict Resolution: Coherence or 
Confusion?, in CONFLICT RESOLUTION THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra, at 3, 6–
7; Morton Deutsch, Introduction, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLU-
TION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1, 1–16 (Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman 
eds., 2000); Ury, supra note 41, at xiii; Kevin E. Joyce, Stop the Fight Without 
Throwing in the Towel, LEGAL MGMT., Jan.–Feb. 2002, at 58, 58–60. 
 44. J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 1 (4th ed. 
2005). 
 45. See John Martin Gillroy, Adjudication Norms, Dispute Settlement Re-
gimes and International Tribunals: The Status of “Environmental Sustainabil-
ity” in International Jurisprudence, 42 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 20 (2006) (stating 
that, while “the existence of international conflict is invariably a sign that the 
existing order is not satisfactorily accommodating the interests of every one of 
the members of the international community . . . , conflict is necessary for the 
development of any society”) (citation omitted). 
 46. See DEUTSCH, supra note 42, at 8–10 (identifying personal and social 
benefits of conflict); FOLLETT, supra note 42, at 39–40 (identifying the benefits 
of conflict in commercial and political contexts). 
 47. See Raymond Shonholtz, A General Theory on Disputes and Conflicts, 
2003 J. DISP. RESOL. 403, 412 (observing, in the context of international con-
flict, that it “is better to have a process that manages conflicts as disputes, as 
such mechanisms through experience and practice can correct, refine, and im-
prove”). 
 48. See Joyce, supra note 43, at 60 (outlining positive aspects of conflict 
such as deterring complacency, promoting greater understanding of views and 
ideas, improving cohesiveness, enhancing innovation, increasing motivation, 
and boosting productivity). 
 49. Malcolm Gladwell describes information “mavens” as those who are 
intense gatherers of information and impressions, and so are often the first to 
pick up on new or nascent trends. MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT 
59–60 (2002). Gladwell suggests that mavens may act most effectively in col-
laboration with “connectors,” namely charismatic people who have a wide net-
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graphic region, or market have a conflict with a government 
regulator. If the conflict is addressed in a constructive manner, 
there are opportunities for the country to increase investor 
loyalty and develop a reputation for being a good place to in-
vest, both of which may increase the likelihood of securing fu-
ture investment.50 
Unmanaged or improperly managed conflict, by contrast, 
can have critical consequences. For example, the Argentinean 
currency crisis of January 2002 led thirty-nine foreign inves-
tors to initiate claims under investment treaties for the eco-
nomic harm they suffered from Argentina’s devaluation of the 
peso.51 As a result, one tribunal awarded $133,200,000 in dam-
ages,52 another awarded $165,240,753,53 and a third held that 
 
work of affiliations and who can transmit the advice or insight of a maven. Id. 
at 55. 
 50. This is not dissimilar to a phenomenon Gladwell described in The 
Tipping Point where, after Lexus first introduced its line of luxury cars in the 
United States, the company realized there was a problem that required a re-
call. Id. at 277–78. Rather than let this conflict fester, Lexus made a special 
effort to provide an exceptionally high level of customer service by calling each 
owner individually the day the recall was announced. Id. In one case, a techni-
cian even flew from Los Angeles to Anchorage to make the necessary repairs. 
Id. Acknowledging that only a small number of Lexus owners were actually 
affected by the repairs, Lexus realized that by treating a small number of in-
fluential consumers well, it could benefit from conflict. Id. As Gladwell ex-
plained, “Lexus realized that it had a captive audience of Mavens and that if 
they went the extra mile they could kick-start a word-of-mouth epidemic about 
the quality of their customer service—and that’s just what happened. The 
company emerged from what could have been a disaster with a reputation for 
customer service that continues to this day.” Id. 
 51. UNCTAD, Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 
IIA MONITOR, No. 4 2006, at 1, 3, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIT/2005/2, 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//webiteiit20052_en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD, 
Latest Developments 2005]. 
 52. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, 44 I.L.M. 1205, 
1257 (ICSID May 12, 2005), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ 
CMS_FinalAward.pdf (holding that Argentina did not expropriate the invest-
ment or engage in arbitrary and discriminatory measures, but determining 
that Argentina failed to provide fair and equitable treatment and failed to “ob-
serve any obligation it may have entered into”). An ad hoc committee recently 
upheld all aspects of the award with the exception of the tribunal’s decision on 
the observation of obligations (i.e., the so-called umbrella clause). CMS Gas 
Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, No. ARB/01/8, Decision of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, ¶ 163 
(ICSID Sept. 25, 2007), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pdf/ 
arb0108_Annulment_Decision.pdf. 
 53. See Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶ 442 
(ICSID July 14, 2006), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ 
AzurixAwardJuly2006.pdf (holding that Argentina did not expropriate the in-
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Argentina breached some (but not all) treaty obligations but 
has not yet decided the quantum of damages.54 
Beyond the financial costs of an adverse award, unman-
aged conflict has other potential negative implications. There 
may be challenges for a country’s international political credi-
bility. For example, should a country fail to honor its invest-
ment treaty obligations,55 other governments might rightly 
react with skepticism about that country’s willingness to comp-
ly with other international economic treaty obligations related 
to tax or trade.56 Such a failure to adhere to agreed rules of law 
might have an economic impact. This might include an in-
creased skepticism that the country is a desirable foreign in-
vestment opportunity, making international lenders unwilling 
to provide funds.57 These problems could lead to a failure to in-
vest or a decision to invest only if there is an appropriately high 
 
vestment but had (1) failed to provide fair and equitable treatment, (2) failed 
to accord full protection and security, and (3) engaged in arbitrary measures). 
 54. See LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, No. ARB/02/1, Deci-
sion on Liability, ¶ 267 (ICSID Oct. 3, 2006), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/ 
documents/LGEArgentinaLiability.pdf (holding that Argentina did not expro-
priate the foreign investment or treat it arbitrarily but that, except for during 
a period of necessity, it “breached the standard of fair and equitable treat-
ment, no less favorable treatment than that to be accorded under internation-
al law, and adopted discriminatory measures”). It is possible that this award 
may provide the parties with a basis for a negotiated settlement. 
 55. There have been some public suggestions by Argentinean political offi-
cials that they may choose not to adhere to their legal obligations to enforce 
adverse arbitration awards. See Osvaldo J. Marzoti, Enforcement of Treaty 
Awards and National Constitutions, 7 BUS. L. INT’L 226, 226 (2006); Guido 
Santiago Tawil, Arbitration in Latin America: Current Trends and Recent De-
velopments, http://web.archive.org/web/20070712134142/http://www 
.bomchilgroup.org/argmar04.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2007) (“Argentine top 
officials have publicly argued the incompatibility of ICSID arbitration with the 
Argentine Constitution, qualified ICSID arbitration as an immature regime, 
[and] announced their will to return to the Calvo doctrine abandoned during 
the [1990s].”). These public comments, particularly if Argentine officials follow 
through, may have adverse political and economic consequences. 
 56. In the trade context, this might include obligations under regional 
trade agreements or the World Trade Organization. In the tax context, it 
might affect dispute resolution obligations under international tax treaties re-
lated to double taxation. See, e.g., Jean-Pierre le Gall, Foreword to WILLIAM 
W. PARK & DAVID R. TILLINGHAST, INCOME TAX TREATY ARBITRATION 5, 5 
(2004). 
 57. See, e.g., Charity L. Goodman, Uncharted Waters: Financial Crisis 
and Enforcement of ICSID Awards in Argentina, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 
449, 480–82 (2007) (suggesting that Argentina’s difficulties with its arbitra-
tion awards may be connected with its treatment of holders of its sovereign 
debt). 
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rate of return, which may pass the risk and cost onto citizens.58 
It might also create credibility problems that lead to a decrease 
in the bond rating associated with government debt instru-
ments—such as Eurobonds—which may prevent governments 
from raising money for public projects.59 Beyond this, there 
may be social costs, such as the unrest during the “Cochabam-
ba Water Wars,”60 or other consequences that adversely affect 
development objectives.61 
B. DISPUTE SYSTEMS DESIGN 
A properly designed dispute resolution system can draw 
conflict to the surface and channel its productive forces. Dis-
pute Systems Design (DSD) is the systematic process of creat-
ing a dispute resolution system that harnesses the positive as-
pects of conflict or at least minimizes the negative aspects.62 
DSD originated in the Alternative Dispute Resolution 
movement and draws on principles of quality control and orga-
nizational development.63 DSD is not a dispute resolution me-
 
 58. See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005, supra note 23, at 48 (observ-
ing that uncertainty can impact investment decisions and may result in de-
manding higher rates of return for the extra risk). 
 59. See, e.g., id. at 36–37, 45–53 (discussing difficulties caused by govern-
ment credibility). 
 60. OSCAR OLIVERA WITH TOM LEWIS, ¡COCHABAMBA! WATER WAR IN BO-
LIVIA 33–47 (2004). The social protests related to the privatization of the water 
sector may be an unrepresentative example of the possibility of social unrest 
given the imposition of martial law and the nature of the protests. It is never-
theless an interesting case history on the implications of international invest-
ment disputes. 
 61. Jan Paulsson, Third World Participation in International Investment 
Arbitration, 2 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 19, 55 (1987) (“Rejection of duly 
rendered awards harms the atmosphere of mutual confidence necessary to the 
process of development . . . if a State enterprise of a developing country repu-
diates its obligation to respect a duly rendered arbitration award, it not only 
poisons its relationship with the individual foreign company seeking to rely on 
the award, but also risks damage to its relations with the ensemble of inves-
tors and lenders whose participation is indispensable to the country’s devel-
opment strategy.”). 
 62. See STITT, supra note 43, at 9–11; see also CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW 
ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL 739–47 
(2005) [hereinafter MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., ADR]; CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW 
ET AL., MEDIATION: PRACTICE, POLICY AND ETHICS 417, 437–40 (2006) [herein-
after MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., MEDIATION]. 
 63. STITT, supra note 43, at xv–xvi; see also Brack Brown, Public Organi-
zations and Policies in Conflict: Notes on Theory and Practice, in CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 43, at 158, 168–69; Michael L. 
Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone, Perspectives on Dispute Resolution, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 14, at 1, 23 (observing that 
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thodology itself. Rather it is the intentional and systematic cre-
ation of an effective, efficient, and fair dispute resolution 
process based upon the unique needs of a particular system.64 
The objective of DSD is to design better dispute resolution 
systems. It does so by (1) analyzing parties’ patterns of disput-
ing to diagnose the current system, (2) designing methods to 
manage conflict more effectively with practical principles, (3) 
approving and implementing the design architecture, and (4) 
testing and evaluating the new design to make appropriate re-
visions prior to disseminating the process to the rest of the sys-
tem.65 As sagely explained by one commentator, this descrip-
tion 
oversimplifies a complex, challenging process that will almost never 
satisfy all the stakeholders. A DSD process does, however, offer the 
potential for organizations, courts, and communities to manage their 
conflict management system wisely and address concerns such as 
whether their system needs more of the values that court trials pro-
vide.66 
Both private and public organizations have used DSD 
techniques to create conflict management systems that settle 
disputes through a range of processes.67 Corporations have em-
 
DSD has been developed to help parties “craft a menu or tiered system of dis-
pute processes tailored for particular organizations or dispute types, especially 
in settings of repetitive disputes or complex legal disputes”). 
 64. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (defining DSD as a process 
of analyzing existing patterns of disputing, creating new processes, and im-
plementing and evaluating the new system to improve its efficacy). 
 65. See WILLIAM L. URY ET AL., GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING 
SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT 41–64 (1988); James P. Groton, The 
Progressive or “Stepped” Approach to ADR: Designing Systems to Prevent, Con-
trol, and Resolve Disputes, in CONSTRUCTION DISPUTE RESOLUTION FORM-
BOOK 1, 6 (Robert F. Cushman et al. eds., 1997) (“The design of a dispute reso-
lution system is not directed at settling a particular dispute, but rather at 
changing the overall pattern of dispute resolution and ultimately changing for 
the better the attitudes and relationships of the parties.”); John Lande, Using 
Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith Participation in Court-
Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REV. 69, 112–17 (2002); Peter 
Robinson et al., DyADS: Encouraging “Dynamic Adaptive Dispute Systems” in 
the Organized Workplace, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 339, 344 (2005) (explain-
ing that DSD goes “beyond specific disputes or dispute resolution mechanisms 
and instead tak[es] a broader look at the full range of conflict within an organ-
ization in order to determine how best to prevent or address the types of con-
flicts the organization experiences over time”). 
 66. John Lande, Shifting the Focus from the Myth of “The Vanishing Tri-
al” to Complex Conflict Management Systems, or I Learned Almost Everything 
I Need to Know About Conflict Resolution from Marc Galanter, 6 CARDOZO J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 191, 209 (2005). 
 67. Id. 
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braced DSD to avoid the expense and destructiveness of indi-
vidual dispute litigation, and because they realize the value of 
improved communication and conflict management in develop-
ment of high-performance organizations.68 
Outside the investment context, the use of DSD has trans-
formed distressed systems into healthy ones with fewer trans-
action costs.69 Improvements include (1) less lost time and 
money to resolve a conflict, (2) fewer missed commercial oppor-
tunities, and (3) fewer outbreaks of violence and decreased 
resort to power struggles.70 Meanwhile, DSD can enhance 
communication and increase party satisfaction with the process 
and result.71 
In William L. Ury’s classic and effective use of DSD at the 
Caney Creek coal mine, the typical “dispute resolution” process 
initially involved employees filing hundreds of grievances each 
year.72 Cases were not settled by negotiation. Instead, they 
went to arbitrations that took years to complete. Meanwhile 
party frustration with ongoing problems regularly boiled over 
into “wildcat” strikes. After a dispute resolution team estab-
lished the trust of employers and employees, it analyzed the 
disputing system and devised a new set of approaches to facili-
tate low-cost and rapid resolution of most disputes. Disputes 
did not disappear, but the parties were better satisfied with the 
fairness with which disputes were addressed.73 Another useful 
by-product was that the rate of strikes dropped considerably.74 
Given its success, DSD has grown beyond its original use 
in United States domestic legal institutions related to employ-
ment, family law, and consumer protection.75 Multinational 
 
 68. Robinson et al., supra note 65, at 344. 
 69. See URY ET AL., supra note 65, at 170–71. 
 70. See COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 41, at 172–75, 191–98; URY 
ET AL., supra note 65, at 169–72. 
 71. See COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 41, at 172–75, 191–98; URY 
ET AL., supra note 65, at 169–72. 
 72. See URY ET AL., supra note 65, at 104–08. 
 73. See id. at 101, 108–15, 130–31. 
 74. Id. at 130–32. 
 75. See LISA B. BINGHAM, IBM CTR. FOR THE BUS. OF GOV’T, MEDIATION 
AT WORK: TRANSFORMING WORKPLACE CONFLICT AT THE UNITED STATES 
POSTAL SERVICE 4 (2003); Robinson et al., supra note 65, at 342–46 (discussing 
the application of DSD and related techniques to the workplace). But see Ai-
mee Gourlay & Jenelle Soderquist, Mediation in Employment Cases Is Too Lit-
tle Too Late: An Organizational Conflict Management Perspective on Resolving 
Disputes, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 261, 286 (1998) (cautioning that the planning of 
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commercial entities and government institutions increasingly 
resort to DSD to establish a tailor-made web of dispute settle-
ment methods to meet individualized needs.76 International 
commentators continue to recommend the use of DSD to man-
age disputes in other jurisdictions.77 
C. AN APPLICATION TO INVESTMENT TREATY CONFLICT? 
Despite the effectiveness of DSD, there has been little liter-
ature considering its utility in approaching investment treaty 
disputes. An emerging body of literature discusses the use of 
nonbinding dispute resolution mechanisms, such as mediation 
and conciliation, on investment treaty claims.78 Nevertheless, 
 
resolving employment disputes “should be approached with careful thought 
and planning”). 
 76. See Nancy J. Manring, Dispute Systems Design and the U.S. Forest 
Service, 9 NEGOTIATION J. 13, 20 (1993) (describing how the United States 
Forest Service institutionalized its dispute resolution procedures and outlining 
challenges for implementing a comprehensive DSD system); Khalil Z. Shariff, 
Designing Institutions to Manage Conflict: Principles for the Problem Solving 
Organization, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 133, 139–42, 157–58 (2003) (providing 
a background on DSD and suggesting a framework for conflict management in 
post-Taliban Afghanistan); Nancy A. Welsh, Institutionalization and Profes-
sionalization, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 14, at 
487, 489 (discussing how Motorola, General Mills, Shell, and Coca-Cola 
adopted company-wide programs to understand and manage disputes). 
 77. Kenneth Cloke, Conflict Resolution Systems Design, the United Na-
tions and the New World Order, 8 MEDIATION Q. 343, 343–44 (1991) (applying 
DSD principles to the United Nations); Jose Alberto Ramirez Leon, Why Fur-
ther Development of ADR in Latin America Makes Sense: The Venezuelan 
Model, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 399, 413 (recommending that Venezuela imple-
ment DSD techniques “so that effective policies can be applied to satisfy the 
needs of the potential users”). 
 78. Jack J. Coe, Jr., Toward a Complementary Use of Conciliation in In-
vestor-State Disputes—A Preliminary Sketch, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 7, 7–31 (2005); Barton Legum, The Difficulties of Conciliation on In-
vestment Treaty Cases: A Comment on Professor Jack C. [sic] Coe’s “Towards a 
Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-State Disputes—A Preliminary 
Sketch,” MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP., Apr. 2006, at 23; Lester Nurick & Stephen 
J. Schnably, The First ICSID Conciliation: Tesoro Petroleum Corporation v. 
Trinidad & Tobago, 1 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 340, 340–50 (1986); 
Ucheora Onwuamaegbu, The Role of ADR in Investor-State Dispute Settle-
ment: The ICSID Experience, NEWS FROM ICSID (Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of 
Inv. Dispute), 2005, at 12, available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/news/ 
news_22-2.pdf; Noah Rubins, Comments to Jack C. [sic] Coe Jr.’s Article on 
Conciliation, MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP., Apr. 2006, at 21; Thomas Wälde, Med-
iation/Alternative Dispute Resolution in Oil, Gas and Energy Transactions: 
Superior to Arbitration/Litigation from a Commercial and Management Pers-
pective, 1 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 2, 2–13 (2004), available at http://www 
.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/journal/html/Vol13/article13-8.pdf. 
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this work is being done on an ad hoc basis and does not consid-
er dispute resolution systematically. 
Systematic consideration is critical.79 Various commenta-
tors suggest the dispute resolution system is in crisis80 and its 
utility is subject to debate.81 Meanwhile, the United Nations 
Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) suggests 
these challenges “could be addressed by improving the dispute 
settlement procedures”82 and the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) has made certain 
procedural changes with the intent of improving the process of 
resolving disputes by arbitration.83 This puts the evolution of 
investment treaty disputes at a unique historical junction: we 
are simultaneously presented with concerns about the system’s 
efficacy and the opportunity to improve its future development. 
Now may be the right time for DSD to borrow a page from 
Caney Creek’s success and secure the benefits for investment 
treaty conflict. DSD could create processes that manage treaty 
conflict in a timely, cost-efficient manner. It might also foster 
systems that respond to stakeholder needs while avoiding phys-
 
 79. As Andrea Schneider observes, particularly for international dispute 
resolution, it is vital to understand how dispute resolution processes started, 
developed, and currently operate to determine how to make the system work 
best. Schneider, supra note 14, at 451. 
 80. See Ari Afilalo, Towards a Common Law of International Investment: 
How NAFTA Chapter 11 Panels Should Solve Their Legitimacy Crisis, 17 GEO. 
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 51, 88 (2004) (explaining that NAFTA’s dispute resolu-
tion system creates a “legal bifurcation” that leads to the application of differ-
ent laws to domestic corporations and foreign investors); Brower, supra note 
11, at 74; Franck, supra note 11, at 1583; supra note 11 and accompanying 
text. 
 81. See generally COHERENCE AND CONSISTENCY IN INTERNATIONAL IN-
VESTMENT LAW (Karl P. Sauvant ed.) (forthcoming 2007); see also WORLD DE-
VELOPMENT REPORT 2005, supra note 23, at 179–80 (discussing the various 
debates about the efficacy of investor-state dispute settlement, including prob-
lems related to putting too much discipline on governments, encroaching on 
regulatory prerogatives, and insufficient transparency). 
 82. UNCTAD, DISPUTES, supra note 9, at 53–54. 
 83. ICSID, ICSID ADDITIONAL FACILITY RULES 7–43 (2006), available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/AFR_English-final.pdf [hereinafter 
ICSID ADDITIONAL FACILITY RULES]; ICSID, ICSID CONVENTION RULES AND 
REGULATIONS 51–99 (2006), available at http://worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/ 
basicdoc.htm [hereinafter ICSID CONVENTION RULES]; ICSID, Possible Im-
provements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration 1–14 (Oct. 22, 2004) (un-
published discussion paper, available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/ 
highlights/improve-arb.pdf ); ICSID, Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules 
and Regulations 3–5 (May 12, 2005) (working paper, available at http:// 
worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/052405-sgmanual.pdf). 
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ical violence84 and protest.85 DSD could also promote creative 
problem solving to resolve disputes according to the parties’ in-
terests and provide relief that a judge or arbitrator would be 
unable to offer.86 
III.  A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO INVESTMENT 
TREATY CONFLICT AND DISPUTE SYSTEMS DESIGN   
Investment treaties and DSD share at least one core con-
cern: both are interested in the effective management of con-
flict.87 Governments presumably sign investment treaties to 
promote investment by providing investors with substantive le-
gal rights.88 Having reasonably anticipated that conflict might 
result from the grant of those rights,89 governments created a 
process to manage the conflict.90 DSD offers an approach to 
 
 84. In Lemire v. Ukraine, 15 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 530, 530–41 
(2000), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Lemire-Award.pdf, for ex-
ample, there were allegations about physical violence that occurred in connec-
tion with a government’s treatment of foreign investment. See infra notes 107 
and 209 (discussing the Lemire case). 
 85. See supra note 60 (discussing the Cochabamba Water Wars). 
 86. See infra notes 208–09 (discussing the creative settlement in Lemire v. 
Ukraine). 
 87. It is possible that governments intend investment treaties to promote 
other objectives, such as the facilitation of development, the elimination of po-
verty, or the development of the rule of law. It is even possible that such inter-
ests may, at some point, be in conflict. For the purposes of exploring the syn-
ergies with DSD, however, this Article focuses on the presumably mutual, and 
fundamental, objective of needing to manage conflict effectively. 
 88. There has been little empirical analysis considering the motivation 
and intention of governments in signing investment treaties. Future analysis 
might usefully consider the governmental intention as regards the signing of 
investment treaties by exploring the text of investment treaties, travaux 
prépatoires, signing statements, governmental press releases, or legislative 
debates regarding treaty implementation. Such an analysis of government in-
tention may provide useful interpretive insights for treaty rights as well as 
information about whether the governments received the intended benefits. 
 89. As of February 28, 1977, the United States Department of State esti-
mated that there were at least 102 investment disputes between United 
States nationals and foreign governments. Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: 
The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign In-
vestment in Developing Countries, 24 INT’L LAW. 655, 659 n.32 (1990). Between 
1960 and 1974, the United Nations identified 875 distinct governmental tak-
ings of foreign property in sixty-two countries. Id. It is unclear, however, 
whether investors’ home governments ever pursued these claims. Id. 
 90. Governments need not provide a process to resolve investment dis-
putes. See Barbara Koremenos, If Only Half of International Agreements Have 
Dispute Resolution Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining?, 36 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 189, 190 (2007) (analyzing a sample of treaties and determining that 
only half contained dispute resolution provisions). 
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conflict management focused on effectively and fairly managing 
individual cases on a systematic basis. Given the unique but re-
lated nature of these two areas, the fundamental question is: 
How, if at all, might these distinct areas of law usefully inform 
each other? 
Effective use of DSD to manage investment treaty conflict 
is likely to reduce the transaction costs of dispute resolution.91 
This could decrease investment risks, lower the cost of invest-
ing, and produce economic incentives that make host govern-
ments more attractive investment opportunities.92 As the 
World Bank explains, effective dispute resolution under in-
vestment treaties benefits investors and governments: 
Governments benefit from a commitment device that can address 
concerns from investors, and thus help them attract more investment 
at lower cost, and also reduces the risk of any later dispute becoming 
politicized. Firms benefit from reduced risk and a more reliable me-
chanism for protecting their rights if the relationship with the host 
government deteriorates.93 
Without effective dispute resolution, the goal of using in-
vestment treaties to promote investment is undermined.94 In-
vestors need security, transparency, predictability, reliability, 
and certainty in the planning of their investments and the reso-
lution of related disputes.95 Poorly planned and poorly managed 
dispute resolution increases the cost of resolving disputes, am-
plifies investment risk, and generates investment disincen-
tives. On a larger scale, the poor management of investment 
treaty conflict could undermine the success of the investment 
 
 91. The World Bank observes that uncertainty can impact investment de-
cisions in various ways, such as demanding higher rates of return for the extra 
risk involved, which results in less investment at higher prices. It may also 
mean that investors may simply refuse to invest at all. WORLD DEVELOPMENT 
REPORT 2005, supra note 23, at 48. 
 92. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing India and Chi-
na’s efforts to spur investment by creating more effective dispute resolution 
systems). 
 93. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005, supra note 23, at 179. 
 94. See Koremenos, supra note 90, at 209 (suggesting that the “decision to 
include certain activities (like dispute resolution) within the governance struc-
ture of an international agreement is the result of a cost-benefit analysis” that 
is presumably provided to further the objectives of the treaty). 
 95. Governments similarly need certainty, predictability, and reliability in 
order to govern effectively, efficiently, and fairly. See WORLD DEVELOPMENT 
REPORT 2005, supra note 23, at 36–37 (observing that “[g]overnments need to 
provide clear rules of the game” and noting that “[p]ublic trust and confidence 
in markets and firms affect not only the feasibility of reforms, but . . . the re-
sponse of firms”). 
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treaty regime. If DSD can improve the dispute resolution sys-
tem and promote efficient conflict management, it is worthy of 
consideration. 
Section A considers possible application of DSD methodol-
ogy to investment treaty conflict, recognizing that we are not 
yet in a position to apply DSD principles fully.96 Section B dis-
cusses the nature of investment treaty conflict and how DSD 
can inform its analysis. Section C considers the historical and 
current methods for resolving investment treaty conflict, and 
Section D deconstructs those methods and considers the costs 
and benefits of the current approach to resolving investment 
conflict. Future scholarship will hopefully use this roadmap to 
apply DSD principles in greater detail. 
A. DSD: SOME POSSIBILITIES FOR INVESTMENT TREATIES 
An initial aspect of the DSD process analyzes (1) what 
types of conflict exist, (2) what systems are in place to address 
that conflict, and (3) what about the system is effective and 
what is inefficient.97 Once this phase is complete, designers can 
determine how best to structure, alter, or augment the existing 
system according to mutually acceptable principles.98 Thereaf-
ter, the design can be implemented, tested, evaluated, and im-
proved as necessary.99 
Using this approach, one might imagine that Argentina, 
for example, could take stock of its investment treaty arbitra-
tion experiences, particularly given the number of cases related 
to its currency crisis.100 Such a diagnosis might involve inviting 
 
 96. Given the current state of the literature and the lack of general or 
specific empirical assessments, as well as the lack of shared principles upon 
which a dispute resolution system should be based, it would also be challeng-
ing to do this on a microlevel (i.e., looking at a specific treaty). Narrowing the 
field of analysis to particular countries could provide significant benefits and 
provide even more tailor-made dispute resolution procedures. 
 97. See COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 41, at 96–116; THE CON-
SENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK 99–136, 169–97 (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 
1999) (detailing the initial steps of DSD); URY ET AL., supra note 65, at 20–40 
(evaluating existing dispute resolution systems); Lande, supra note 65, at 115 
(describing the initial steps of how DSD might be used in the context of court-
connected mediation); Shariff, supra note 76, at 139–40 (discussing the need 
for DSD to be deliberate and purposeful in order to create a system that 
achieves desired objectives). 
 98. See COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 41, at 117–33; URY ET AL., 
supra note 65, at 101–33. 
 99. See supra notes 65–66 (describing phases of the DSD process). 
 100. See ICSID, List of Pending Cases, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/ 
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experts to assess what conduct created potential liability, those 
sectors affected, and the types of disputes that actually arose. 
Experts might then assess the adequacy of the current arbitra-
tion process and the scope of possible improvements given the 
principles Argentina wishes to promote in its dispute resolution 
procedures. 
Hypothetically, to save taxpayer and governmental re-
sources and create solutions in the best interests of all parties, 
Argentina might prefer to mediate and engage in creative prob-
lem solving. In the absence of a settlement, however, Argentina 
might wish to resolve its disputes under different treaties in 
one place, such as a court or mixed claims commission, that 
may be open to the public. Such an arrangement would provide 
cost-efficient dispute resolution in a single, public forum for the 
resolution of disputes related to a single government measure. 
If, however, Argentina determined that there was a benefit in 
the flexibility of ad hoc but potentially inconsistent decisions of 
arbitration tribunals, it might retain the current mechanism. 
Having designed a process based upon the assessment and 
foundational principles, Argentina might then draft a model 
investment treaty and use it as a basis for future treaty negoti-
ations. Argentina might have an opportunity to assess the utili-
ty of the new procedures and determine whether further 
changes to the design were warranted. The remainder of this 
Part explores this potential approach in a generalized way by 
considering historical and current approaches to investment 
treaty conflict. 
B. THE NATURE OF INVESTMENT TREATY CONFLICT 
1. Investment Treaty Conflict 
Investment treaty conflict typically arises when govern-
ment conduct has a direct or indirect adverse effect upon a for-
eign investment. Historically, this involved activities associated 
with a traditional international law violation, such as the na-
tionalization of a business without fair compensation.101 These 
days, investment treaty conflict can arise from more subtle 
government conduct, such as (1) the revocation of a banking li-
 
cases/pending.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2007) [hereinafter ICSID Pending 
Cases] (listing cases involving Argentina’s currency crisis). 
 101. See, e.g., Elettronica Sicula, S.p.A (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy) 1989 I.C.J. 4, 
15, 32 (July 20) (addressing an alleged treaty violation involving the public 
taking of private business assets). 
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cense,102 (2) a change in the interpretation of tax law that de-
creases an anticipated refund,103 (3) the implementation of an 
environmental regulation that has a disparate but adverse fi-
nancial impact upon foreign investors,104 (4) a failure to advise 
an investor about the licenses needed to operate an invest-
ment,105 or (5) an alleged breach of a commercial contract to 
which the government was a party.106 
As a concrete example of how conflict can arise, imagine a 
United States investor buys a privatized group of Ukrainian 
radio stations, develops broadcasting capacity, and becomes the 
market leader of innovative radio programming. Then imagine 
that some government conduct prevents the investor from uti-
lizing the broadcast frequencies, and the government fails to 
renew the investor’s broadcasting license. The United States 
investor, who once had a profitable business, wants to redress 
the perceived wrong. In some sense, this resembles Lemire v. 
Ukraine, where after failing to resolve the dispute amicably, a 
United States media entrepreneur, Joseph Lemire, initiated 
arbitration against Ukraine under the United States/Ukraine 
bilateral investment treaty.107 
 
 102. See, e.g., Genin v. Estonia, 17 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 395, 471 
(2002), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Genin-Award.pdf. 
 103. See, e.g., Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Ecuador, No. UN3467, 
2004 WL 3267260, at ¶ 29 (London Ct. Int’l Arb. July 1, 2004). 
 104. See, e.g., Methanex Corp. v. United States, 44 I.L.M. 1345, 1345 (UN-
CITRAL 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organizations/ 
51052.pdf. 
 105. See, e.g., Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, 40 I.L.M. 36, 41–42 (ICSID 2001), 
available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/MetacladAward-English.pdf. 
 106. See, e.g., SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Philippines, No. 
ARB/02/6, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 1 (ICSID 
Jan. 29, 2004), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/SGSvPhil-final_ 
001.pdf; LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina, 21 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 
203, 244–46 (2006), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ 
LGEArgentinaLiability.pdf (finding a failure to adhere to obligations where 
there was an “abrogation of the guarantees under the statutory framework”). 
These are referred to as “umbrella clause” claims. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra 
note 34, at 81–82. 
 107. See Lemire v. Ukraine, 15 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 530, 530–41 
(2000), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Lemire-Award.pdf. Al-
though the details are unknown given the proceedings’ confidential nature, 
there is some public information. See Marek Hessel & Ken Murphy, Stealing 
the State, and Everything Else: A Survey of Corruption in the Postcommunist 
World (working paper, available at http://www.toni-schonfelder.com/print 
.asp?idte=243) (last visited Oct. 17, 2007) (explaining that when Gala Radio—
Mr. Lemire’s station—“lawfully reported its income, announcing a profit on 
which it paid taxes, all hell broke loose. Gala was banned from the airwaves, 
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2. Using DSD: Systematic Analysis of Investment Treaty 
Conflict 
The previous section offers specific examples of investment 
conflict that have resulted in a final arbitration award. It does 
not, however, look at investment treaty conflict systematically 
to describe the universe of investment conflict. DSD adds this 
vital element and looks beyond the tip of the iceberg to provide 
a more complete picture of investment treaty conflict. DSD 
would recommend a system-wide diagnostic to seek out infor-
mation about the characteristics of investment conflict.108 This, 
in turn, would permit stakeholders to create more efficient and 
properly tailored dispute resolution systems. 
At present, there has not been a systematic conflict as-
sessment109—let alone general empirical research—to analyze 
investment treaty conflict. There has been some scrutiny of 
NAFTA-based investment claims submitted to arbitration, but 
there is little attention given to investment treaties more 
broadly.110 
UNCTAD has done groundbreaking work that analyzes the 
increasing number of arbitration claims brought.111 At the end 
 
equipment was stolen, another station with the same name and logo appeared 
on the same radio frequency, with a license issued by the National Council on 
Radio and Television Broadcasting”); see also Foreign Operations, Export Fi-
nancing, and Related Programs Appropriations for 1999: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs of 
the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 105th Cong. 385–402 (1998) (testimony of 
Joseph Lemire, President, Gala Radio & TV Co. and Olympic Champions, 
Ltd.) [hereinafter Foreign Operations]. 
 108. DSD might be able to examine, for example, what types of conflict do 
not escalate. For example, it might be able to analyze those cases where dis-
putes are negotiated, settled, or abandoned prior to the crystallization of the 
dispute or the filing of a request for arbitration. 
 109. See Lawrence Susskind & Jennifer Thomas-Larmer, Conducting a 
Conflict Assessment, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 97, 
at 99–135 (describing various approaches to conducting conflict assessments). 
 110. See, e.g., Guillermo A. Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of 
Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 401–07 
(2003) (outlining a “score card” of investment treaty cases arising under NAF-
TA); Jack J. Coe, Jr., Taking Stock of NAFTA Chapter 11 in Its Tenth Year: An 
Interim Sketch of Selected Themes, Issues, and Methods, 36 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT’L L. 1381, 1455–60 (2003) (providing data about NAFTA-based claims). 
But see Franck, supra note 13. 
 111. See UNCTAD, Latest Developments 2005, supra note 51 (identifying 
the number of investment treaty arbitrations, breaking the numbers down by 
institution, and discussing which sectors the disputes arise in); UNCTAD, Re-
cent Developments, supra note 9, at 13–15 (discussing recent trends in invest-
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of 2005, UNCTAD identified at least 229 known arbitration 
cases, two-thirds of which were filed within the last five 
years.112 In the first eleven months of 2006, at least another 
twenty-five claims were filed.113 The financial impact of these 
cases is not insignificant. While sometimes governments lose 
and sometimes they win,114 the amounts in dispute can involve 
hundreds of millions of dollars115 and tribunals can make large 
awards against a government, such as the $270 million award 
in CME v. Czech Republic.116 Despite its value, UNCTAD’s 
work is limited. It only considers disputes submitted to arbitra-
 
ment treaty disputes). See generally UNCTAD, DISPUTES, supra note 9 (re-
viewing recent disputes arising from investment treaties). 
 112. Press Release, UNCTAD, UNCTAD Reviews Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement Cases and Draws Implications for Developing Countries (Feb. 5, 
2006), http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflyer.asp?docid=6967& 
intItemID=1528&lang=1 (observing that the “cumulative number of known 
treaty-based cases [was] at least 229 through the end of the 2005 ([although] 
the number stood at 219 at the time of printing of [UNCTAD’s] report)”); UN-
CTAD, DISPUTES, supra note 9, at 4–5 (referring to the 219 disputes filed as of 
November 2005). One of the difficulties with this work, however, is the lack of 
transparency about UNCTAD’s research methodology, which creates uncer-
tainties. This makes it difficult to replicate the results or assess the study’s 
validity and reliability. 
 113. Latest Developments 2005, supra note 51, at 2. Although the metho-
dology was not explained, the publication did indicate that the draft was pre-
pared by Federico Ortino who works with the Investment Treaty Forum affi-
liated with the British Institute of International and Comparative Law. See 
id.; see also UNCTAD Study Provides New Data on Incidence of Investment 
Treaty Arbitration, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Int’l Inst. for Sustainable 
Dev., Winnipeg, Manitoba, Can.), Jan. 12, 2006, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/ 
itn_jan12_2006.pdf (suggesting that Luke Eric Peterson authored similar re-
search and briefly describing his methodology). 
 114. See Franck, supra note 13 (observing that, in the context of final arbi-
tration awards that were publicly available prior to June 1, 2006, governments 
won approximately 57.7% of the time, investors won 38.5% of the time, and 
the remaining cases were resolved through settlement agreements). 
 115. Charles H. Brower, II, Council Comment: Reform Priorities at Interna-
tional Trade & Investment Institutions, 21 AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. NEWSLETTER 
(Am. Soc’y Int’l L., Wash., D.C.), Aug.–Oct. 2005, at 6 (indicating that “ICSID’s 
docket comprises some 90 cases involving $25 billion, as opposed to five cases 
involving $15 million ten years ago”); see also Franck, supra note 13 (suggest-
ing that the average amount claimed from publicly available awards was in 
the order of $343 million). 
 116. See UNCTAD, DISPUTES, supra note 9, at 9–12 (outlining the poten-
tial financial impacts of investment treaty arbitration awards and noting the 
$270 million award against the Czech Republic in one case); cf. Franck, supra 
note 13 (suggesting that the average amount received is on the order of $10 
million for all final awards and on the order of $25 million for final awards 
where investors recover, which indicates that the $270 million award of CME 
v. Czech Republic appears to be a statistical outlier). 
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tion; it does not address investment treaty conflict subject to 
other types of dispute resolution.117 
A DSD diagnostic could gather basic information about 
whether the conflict involves factual, technical, legal, interper-
sonal, communication, or political issues. Such a diagnostic 
might also usefully evaluate which investment sectors tend to 
experience high levels of conflict, the types of harm investors 
experience, the government conduct most likely to lead to alle-
gations of harm, any explanations given for government con-
duct, the ways governments find out about disputes, the ways 
nonparties influence the conflict, which treaties are most fre-
quently invoked in arbitrations, which treaty signatories and 
investors are involved in investment disputes, and the var-
iables that affect the escalation or resolution of the conflict.118 
In this manner, parties can identify the types of conflict that 
may arise in the future119 and create challenges. They can also 
identify processes to promote effective conflict resolution.120 
Such an analysis may be useful, in part, because invest-
ment treaties were originally promulgated to deal with cases of 
 
 117. Franck, supra note 13. 
 118. One preliminary study analyzing publicly available arbitration 
awards has begun this process. See generally Franck, supra note 13. It consid-
ers what sectors experience conflict, which investors are invoking the treaties, 
which countries are subjected to claims, and which treaties are arbitrated. Id. 
The work, however, does not consider all of the issues recommended in this 
article and is also not a comprehensive assessment of investment treaty con-
flict. Id. It may, however, provide a useful starting point for future empirical 
assessment. Id. 
 119. It may even be useful to gather this data in order to create various di-
agnostic tools that predict the types of disputes likely to arise in the future. 
The construction industry has conducted analysis of construction disputes and 
the characteristics of construction projects. Groton, supra note 65, at 9. This 
analysis led to the development of the Disputes Potential Index, or DPI, that 
“identifies the presence of dispute-prone characteristics on a project, evaluates 
them, and reports the results to project team members so they can take action 
to correct them before they actually generate problems.” Id. Taking a page 
from the construction industry—whether on a country-by-country or industry-
by-industry basis—may yield useful information about investment-related 
conflict and the most useful methods to manage it. 
 120. Under the Pareto Principle, for example, eighty percent of a problem 
can be attributed to twenty percent of the causes. Focusing on the most se-
rious issues may be useful at the outset, but the remaining eighty percent of 
the causes should not be ignored. See Joseph M. Juran, The Quality Control 
Process, in JURAN’S QUALITY HANDBOOK 5.1, 5.20–5.24 (Joseph M. Juran & A. 
Blanton Godfrey eds., 5th ed. 1999) (applying the Pareto principles to issues of 
quality control). 
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expropriation.121 With the grant of new rights—such as the 
right to “fair and equitable treatment” and the so-called um-
brella clause—the nature of problematic government conduct, 
investor claims, and parties’ needs are likely shifting.122 It 
would be useful to identify and understand the areas of most 
significant risk. This would ensure that conflict is managed 
through the process most likely to result in an appropriate res-
olution. In other words, the forum should fit the fuss.123 
C. THE SYSTEMS TO ADDRESS INVESTMENT CONFLICT 
After a diagnostic of investment treaty conflict, DSD re-
quires consideration of the methods to resolve disputes. This 
section considers the historical and current methods for resolv-
ing investment treaty disputes. 
1. Historical Antecedents: The Previous Methods of Resolving 
Investment Treaty Conflict 
In the past, foreign investors had limited options for re-
dressing international law violations. When government con-
duct adversely affected an investment, investors were relegated 
to a series of somewhat unappealing dispute resolution options. 
This typically left investors (1) to the political mercies of their 
own government, the host government, or both when deciding 
whether a claim should be brought to address the investor’s 
complaints, (2) litigating in the host government’s national 
courts where defenses of sovereign immunity were often readily 
available, or (3) absorbing the cost of adverse government ac-
tion by either doing nothing or making a claim under their po-
 
 121. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment 
Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157, 168–69 (2005). 
 122. The different nature of the rights may call for the availability of dif-
ferent dispute resolution mechanisms. In expropriation cases, the loss is 
usually close to one hundred percent, damages can be quite large, and it may 
be difficult to negotiate a settlement. In contrast, a claim for fair and equitable 
treatment may be subject to a different set of damages. Because damages may 
be lower, there is likely to be a broader zone of possible agreement between 
the parties. LAWRENCE SUSSKIND ET AL., NEGOTIATING ENVIRONMENTAL 
AGREEMENTS: HOW TO AVOID ESCALATING CONFRONTATION, NEEDLESS 
COSTS, AND UNNECESSARY LITIGATION 35 (2000) (discussing zones of possible 
agreement). 
 123. See Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the 
Fuss: A User-Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOTIATION 
J. 49, 66 (1994). 
FRANCK_6FMT 12/13/2007 9:08 AM 
2007] INVESTMENT TREATY CONFLICT 191 
 
litical risk insurance.124 Ultimately these limited opportunities 
were often unpalatable for investors who had suffered severe or 
even total losses related to government expropriation.125 
2. The Current Framework for Resolving Investment Treaty 
Conflict 
The creation of investor-state dispute resolution mechan-
ism in investment treaties was a sea change. These new provi-
sions provided investors with the means to bring host govern-
ments to the dispute resolution table.126 
Treaties are individually negotiated and there is no uni-
form dispute resolution process. There is, however, a general 
trend.127 Many treaties have a two-tiered dispute resolution 
process leading towards a final resolution by an arbitration tri-
bunal.128 
 
 124. See Franck, supra note 11, at 1620–21 n.469; Salacuse, supra note 9. 
For those cases where an investor has contracted directly with a host govern-
ment—for example, in the context of a concession contract—investors may also 
have a contractual right to arbitrate disputes arising out of or relating to that 
underlying commercial arrangement. See COMEAUX & KINSELLA, supra note 6, 
at 185–210 (discussing options for investors in contract disputes with govern-
ments). 
 125. See Salacuse, supra note 89, at 659 n.32. 
 126. The investor-state dispute resolution mechanism is a distinct issue 
from the state-to-state dispute resolution mechanisms also typically provided 
in investment treaties. See Bernardo M. Cremades, Has the Proliferation of 
BITs Gone Too Far? Is It Now Time for a Multilateral Investment Treaty?, 5 J. 
WORLD INV. & TRADE 89, 90–91 (2004) (describing the new development of re-
questing state-to-state arbitration to interpret a BIT); Franck, supra note 6, at 
53–54 n.26 (discussing cases where state-to-state arbitration was initiated af-
ter an investor-state claim was initiated). While this Article primarily focuses 
on investor-state arbitration, to complete a thorough analysis of the system 
and given the potential for cross-contamination, both aspects of the system de-
serve serious consideration. 
 127. E.g., U.N. CTR. TRANSNAT’L CORPS., BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREA-
TIES at 66–70, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/65, U.N. Sales No. E.88.II.A.1 (1988); UN-
CTAD, BITs, supra note 4, at 92–96; UNCTAD, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: INVES-
TOR-STATE at 12–13, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/30, U.N. Sales No. 
E.03.II.D.5 (2003), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit30_en.pdf 
[hereinafter UNCTAD, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT]; DOLZER & 
STEVENS, supra note 34, at 119–21. 
 128. E.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United Arab 
Emirates for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K.-U.A.E., art. 
8(1), Dec. 8, 1992, 1994 U.K.T.S. No. 24, available at http://www.unctad.org/ 
sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/uk_uae.pdf. 
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a. First-Tier Dispute Resolution 
The first tier of the dispute resolution is about fulfilling 
certain conditions precedent to having the right to arbitrate.129 
This may, for example, require investors to engage in “amicable 
settlement” for a few months.130 Although less frequent, inves-
tors may also be required to litigate in home government courts 
and exhaust their local remedies before proceeding to their in-
ternational ones.131 In some circumstances, however, there is 
no obligation to engage in a pre-arbitration dispute resolution 
process or even a suggestion that such a method might be pru-
dent.132 
Regardless of whether investors are required or recom-
mended to engage in these activities, there are often other pre-
conditions to accessing arbitration. First, investors must often 
submit a dispute notice.133 Second, investors are typically re-
quired to wait for a few months—often three to six—to “cool  
 
 129. See id. (providing for informal resolution prior to arbitration). Fur-
thermore, not all investment treaties permit arbitration. For example, a treaty 
between Japan and the Philippines states that in the absence of a subsequent 
agreement to a formal investor-state dispute resolution procedure, arbitration 
can only occur with both parties’ consent. Agreement Between Japan and the 
Republic of the Philippines for an Economic Partnership, Japan-Phil., art. 107, 
Sept. 9, 2006, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/philippine/epa0609/main 
.pdf. 
 130. UNCTAD, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, supra note 127, at 
22–23; Calvin A. Hamilton & Paula I. Rochwerger, Trade and Investment: 
Foreign Direct Investment Through Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties, 18 
N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 50 (2005); see also NAFTA, supra note 29, ch.11, art. 1118 
(referring instead to dispute settlement by “consultation or negotiation”). 
Many treaties do not make “amicable settlement” mandatory. Sometimes they 
do not even mention it as an option, and in other instances it is merely a rec-
ommended, nonbinding option. Instead, treaties permit investors to bypass 
this step and go directly to arbitration, provided they meet all other precondi-
tions, like submitting a dispute notice. See infra note 272 (discussing the vari-
ous positions of the U.S. Model BITs on the issue of mandatory versus optional 
negotiation). 
 131. Andrea K. Bjorklund, Reconciling State Sovereignty and Investor Pro-
tection in Denial of Justice Claims, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 809, 876 (2005); Vande-
velde, supra note 121, at 174–75. 
 132. The 1994 U.S. Model BIT did not refer to pre-arbitration negotiation, 
consultation, or the amicable resolution of disputes. Model Treaty Between the 
Government of the United States of America and the Government of [Country] 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-
[Country], art. IX, Apr. 1994, reprinted in UNCTAD, INTERNATIONAL INVEST-
MENT INSTRUMENTS: A COMPENDIUM VOL. III at 201–02, U.N. Doc. UN-
CTAD/DTC/30, U.N. Sales No. E.96.II.A.11 (1996). 
 133. Hamilton & Rochwerger, supra note 130, at 50; see also 2004 U.S. 
Model BIT, supra note 19, art. 24(2)–(3). 
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off” from the time the dispute arose to when it can formally re-
quest arbitration.134 As a practical matter, this might mean 
that some kind of negotiation can occur during the prescribed 
waiting period after an investor submits a dispute notice.135 It 
also means, however, that an investor may be able to submit a 
dispute notice and head to arbitration without ever trying and 
perhaps without even considering other forms of dispute reso-
lution.136 
b. Second-Tier Dispute Resolution 
At the second tier, governments typically offer to arbitrate 
claims of treaty violations to finally resolve disputes.137 Trea-
ties usually permit investors to choose where to arbitrate those 
claims. Often, this means investors can elect to arbitrate before 
(1) an ad hoc tribunal organized under the UNCITRAL Arbitra-
tion Rules, (2) the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, or (3) a 
tribunal organized through ICSID.138 
When investors fulfill their first-tier obligations but the 
conflict remains unresolved, an investor then selects an arbi-
tral forum from the treaty and submits a “Request for Arbitra-
 
 134. UNCTAD, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, supra note 127, at 
25; see also Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of 
Ecuador for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K.-Ecuador, art. 
8, May 10, 1994, 1996 U.K.T.S. No. 18, available at http://www.unctad.org/ 
sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/ecuador_uk.pdf (permitting the arbitration of dis-
putes where “agreement cannot be reached within six months between the 
parties to this dispute through the pursuit of local remedies or otherwise”). 
 135. This appears to be the hope of certain institutions. See WORLD DE-
VELOPMENT REPORT 2005, supra note 23, at 88 (suggesting disputes can be re-
solved with informal negotiation). 
 136. Presumably, it would not necessarily be in an investor’s economic, ra-
tional self-interest to incur the costs of arbitration without having tried other 
types of dispute resolution. This, however, presumes that investors are ration-
al, profit-maximizing individuals. There may be situations where the initiation 
of a process will waste resources if appropriate government officials have indi-
cated they are unwilling to consider such a process. 
 137. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 34, at 129–56. In some cases, coun-
tries let investors elect between national courts, pre-existing dispute resolu-
tion arrangements, and international arbitration in order to finally resolve the 
dispute. Franck, supra note 11, at 1541–42. There are few, if any, known in-
stances where an investor has brought an investment treaty claim to either a 
national court or a pre-agreed dispute resolution process. Franck, supra note 
6, at 54–55; see also Franck, supra note 11, at 1542 n.78 (noting that invest-
ment claims might go to national courts but only where investors are unaware 
of their arbitration options). 
 138. See Franck, supra note 6, at 54. 
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tion” or equivalent document.139 The investor then selects one 
arbitrator.140 After, the state picks a second arbitrator, and the 
parties typically select a third arbitrator who serves as the 
chair.141 Next, the parties gather evidence and present argu-
ments,142 and the tribunal renders an award that is enforceable 
worldwide.143 
3. Consideration of Specific Dispute Resolution Provisions 
It could be appropriate to assess a country’s specific dis-
pute resolution systems. This might occur at a macrolevel, a 
microlevel, or perhaps both. 
A macrolevel analysis of the dispute resolution mechan-
isms in the nearly 2500 investment treaties would be a rather 
significant undertaking.144 It could reveal useful information 
about patterns and variations in dispute resolution that would 
place specific dispute resolution mechanisms in a global con-
text. UNCTAD’s analysis of variations in investment treaty 
provisions is a useful step in this direction.145 
 
 139. See, e.g., Arbitration Inst. of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
[SCC Inst.], Arbitration Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce, art. 2 (2007), available at http://www.sccinstitute 
.com/_upload/shared_files/regler/2007_Arbitration_Rules_eng.pdf (establishing 
the requirements for a claimant’s request for arbitration); Int’l Bank for Re-
constr. Dev., Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between 
States and Nationals of Other States, art. 36, Mar. 18, 1965, 4 I.L.M. 524, 536 
[hereinafter ICSID Convention] (establishing the requirements of a request for 
arbitration); ICSID ADDITIONAL FACILITY RULES, supra note 83, arts. 1–3 (es-
tablishing the requirements of a request for arbitration); U.N. Comm’n on Int’l 
Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Decision on UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 18, 
Apr. 28, 1976, 15 I.L.M. 701, 708 [hereinafter UNCITRAL, Rules] (providing 
for a claimant to file a statement of claim). 
 140. UNCITRAL, Rules, supra note 139. 
 141. Under the ICSID Convention, parties can agree on the appointment of 
the president of the tribunal. ICSID Convention, supra note 139, art. 37(2). By 
contrast, under ad hoc UNCITRAL arbitration, the party-appointed arbitra-
tors agree on the appointment of the Chair. UNCITRAL, Rules, supra note 
139, art. 7(1). 
 142. See, e.g., UNCITRAL, Rules, supra note 139, art. 15. While this has 
historically occurred in private, with a push towards enhanced transparency 
in the dispute resolution process, more of the arbitration process is accessible 
to the public. See Franck, supra note 11, at 1544–45. 
 143. See Franck, supra note 11, at 1543–45; Franck, supra note 6, at 55. 
 144. See Jason W. Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in the Empirical Study 
of Bilateral Investment Treaties 12–17 (May 2006) (working paper, available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=903680) (providing an 
empirical analysis of dispute resolution provisions of 1000 investment trea-
ties). 
 145. See generally UNCTAD, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 1995–
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A microlevel analysis would involve analyzing a state’s 
specific dispute resolution obligations. For example, Argentina 
might engage in two types of analysis. First, it might analyze 
the treaty between Argentina and France, which has been the 
subject of arbitration.146 Second, it might consult treaties with 
its other counter-parties. Having contextualized their own pro-
cedures, Argentina would be able to better assess the utility of 
its dispute resolution systems. 
D. USING DSD: ANALYZING THE UTILITY OF THE CURRENT 
SYSTEM 
DSD necessitates a deconstruction of existing processes in 
light of the actual conflicts to determine what is effective and 
what is inefficient.147 In the investment treaty context, DSD 
might usefully examine the utility, costs, and benefits of the ex-
isting two-tier system.148 
1. First-Tier Dispute Resolution: Nonbinding Methods 
There are a variety of difficulties related to the first tier of 
the process. Most of the problems are likely to result from the 
use of “amicable resolution” of disputes or difficulties related to 
communicating about conflict. 
a. Difficulties with “Amicable Resolution” 
The reference to the “amicable resolution” of disputes exhi-
bits a variety of potential problems. First, there is a lack of 
clarity and consensus about the need to require, recommend, or 
even mention nonbinding forms of dispute resolution in in-
 
2006: TRENDS IN INVESTMENT RULEMAKING, U.N. Doc. UN-
CTAD/ITE/IIT/2006/5, U.N. Sales No. E.06.II.D.16 (2006), available at http:// 
www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20065_en.pdf. 
 146. Décret n˚ 93-834 du 28 mai 1993 portant publication de l’accord entre 
le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de la Répu-
blique Argentine sur l’encouragement et la protection réciproques des inves-
tissements (ensemble une déclaration), Fr.-Arg., July 3, 1991, 1993 Fr. T.S. 
8164, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/france_ 
argentina_fr.pdf. 
 147. During the stage of determining the mutually acceptable principles 
upon which the dispute resolution system should be based, parties can assess 
the value of aspects such as fairness, transparency, and precedent. 
 148. The limited nature of information about investment treaty conflict 
necessarily makes this analysis preliminary and tentative. Once further in-
formation is available, a reevaluation of the two tiers and overall structure 
might provide further insights. 
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vestment treaties.149 It is vital to debate the utility of a manda-
tory versus consensual approach to dispute resolution150 and 
consider the availability of different types of dispute resolution. 
Nevertheless, the lack of clarity and consensus may adversely 
affect parties’ opportunities to discuss possible solutions or 
promote alternative settlement opportunities.151 For example, 
parties might use the failure to reference or require “amicable 
resolution” in the treaty as an excuse to avoid possible conflict 
resolution. 
Second, it is not clear what process the parties are electing 
with the “amicable resolution” methodology. While it presuma-
bly refers to a nonbinding process like negotiation or mediation, 
this meaning is not typically explained.152 While the lack of 
guidance about the process may provide the parties with a de-
gree of flexibility,153 there are nevertheless problems. This may 
cause confusion for legal cultures with different dispute resolu-
tion traditions154 or working definitions of mediation and other 
forms of nonbinding dispute resolution.155 
 
 149. See infra note 272 and accompanying text (observing that the United 
States has vacillated between mandating and recommending first-tier dispute 
resolution). 
 150. There is debate in investment conflict about the appropriateness of 
required versus consensual negotiation. See Coe, supra note 78, at 14–18. This 
reflects larger debates in the dispute resolution literature about the challenges 
related to mandatory or consensual use of nonbinding dispute resolution me-
chanisms. See MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., ADR, supra note 62, at 560–63; MEN-
KEL-MEADOW ET AL., MEDIATION, supra note 62, at 286–89. See generally 
RISKIN ET AL., supra note 3 (discussing the pros and cons of various systems). 
 151. Presumably, reasonable and rational investors and governments may 
have tried to negotiate a settlement prior to the escalation of the conflict. Nev-
ertheless, this is not always an appropriate presumption. Sometimes a resolu-
tion cannot be achieved without consulting a different group of decision mak-
ers in a different context. 
 152. See Rubins, supra note 78, at 3. NAFTA is slightly more precise and 
requires that “disputing parties should first attempt to settle a claim through 
consultation or negotiation.” NAFTA, supra note 29, art. 1118. It does not de-
fine what consultation should or must entail. Id. 
 153. One might argue it is better to leave the terms of amicable resolution 
as broad and undefined as possible. But where parties are in the middle of a 
conflict and there may be tactical advantages to delaying or foreclosing certain 
dispute resolution methods, the parties may spend energy disputing the dis-
pute resolution method rather than resolving the underlying dispute. A clear 
set of dispute resolution procedures has critical systematic efficiencies in these 
circumstances. 
 154. A classic example of cultural and linguistic misunderstanding was 
made in the Iran-United States hostage crisis. “[I]n Persian, the word ‘com-
promise’ apparently lacks the positive meaning it has in English of ‘a midway 
solution both sides can live with,’ but has only a negative meaning as in ‘her 
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Third, it can be unclear what affirmative obligations may 
exist in connection with the dispute resolution method. This 
may create difficulties, for example, where one party presumes 
there must be “good faith” in this aspect of the dispute resolu-
tion process, but another party disagrees with this obligation or 
has a different understanding of what it means to bargain “in 
good faith.”156 
 
virtue was compromised’ or ‘our integrity was compromised.’ Similarly, the 
word ‘mediator’ in Persian suggests ‘meddler,’ someone who is barging in un-
invited. In early 1980 U.N. Secretary General Waldheim flew to Iran to deal 
with the hostage question. His efforts were seriously set back when Iranian 
national radio and television broadcast in Persian a remark he reportedly 
made on his arrival in Tehran: ‘I have come as a mediator to work out a com-
promise.’ Within an hour of the broadcast, his car was being stoned by angry 
Iranians.” ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING 
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 34 (1981) (emphasis in original). 
 155. Amy Cohen explains that in western traditions “mediation is a fixed, 
bounded, and determinate set of institutional practices to resolve conflict that 
are, at all times, informal (dissociated from the state), private, neutral, and 
non-coercive. Any analysis of mediation in developing countries, however, re-
veals a set of institutional practices that are far more complex than this as-
sumption allows. Mediation changes as it travels . . . .” Amy J. Cohen, Debat-
ing the Globalization of U.S. Mediation: Politics, Power, and Practice in Nepal, 
11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 295, 296 (2006). In Japan, even though its civil pro-
cedure system is nearly identical to Germany’s, the mediation experience is 
quite different from many Western countries. Katja Funken, Comparative 
Dispute Management: Court-Connected Mediation in Japan and Germany, 3 
GERMAN L.J. ¶ 2 (2002), http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id= 
130. Prior to the Law Concerning Promotion and Use of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (Law No. 151 of 2004), Japanese court-connected mediation in-
cluded many unique features, such as the following: (1) Japanese courts ap-
pointed a mediation committee composed of a judge and two non-judge media-
tors, (2) mediators had the status of government employees and “female 
mediators hired by the family courts [were] housewives,” (3) the mediation 
committee could ask interested persons to attend the mediation irrespective of 
party agreement, (4) parties met with mediators individually and did not ne-
gotiate directly on the theory that “negative emotions will burst out . . . [and 
violate] the court’s dignity and make it more difficult to reach an agreement,” 
(5) mediators had the power to examine witnesses and procure expert opi-
nions, and (6) mediation agreements were enforceable as court judgments, un-
less the court deemed it is contrary to law or public policy. Id. ¶¶ 8–13, 24–29. 
The new law was scheduled to become effective before June 2007 to set out 
principles for ADR and introduce government certificates for ADR service pro-
viders. Hiroyuki Tezekua & Yoko Maeda, Japan: Recent Developments in ADR 
Law, 1 MEDIATION NEWSL. (Int’l Bar Assoc., London, U.K.), Apr. 2005, at 23–
25. 
 156. Referring to the Tradex case, UNCTAD suggests that “the obligation 
to negotiate and consult before initiating the other means of dispute settle-
ment is not to be taken lightly: it is an obligation of substance and context. 
The parties to the dispute must negotiate in good faith.” UNCTAD, INVESTOR-
STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, supra note 127, at 24. Unfortunately, the cited 
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Fourth, despite a textual obligation to “cool off” or nego-
tiate disputes, arbitrators have not enforced these obliga-
tions.157 Instead, tribunals let investors proceed to arbitration 
without fulfilling the preconditions.158 Ultimately, the failure to 
articulate mutual expectations, the lack of substantive parame-
ters, and an unwillingness to enforce these provisions leaves 
this “amicable resolution” methodology with much confusion 
and little force.159 
Given the generally confidential nature of investment trea-
ty dispute resolution, it is difficult to isolate those factors that 
actively affect parties’ decisions to resolve cases prior to the 
submission of a request for arbitration.160 Although ICSID’s ar-
bitration docket and anecdotal evidence suggest that settle-
ments occur,161 there is little empirical evidence describing set-
tlement rates generally, let alone whether settlements were 
 
authority does not support the argument. Rather, in a case involving a nation-
al investment law and not an investment treaty, Tradex holds that an investor 
sending the government a series of letters made a “sufficient good faith effort 
to reach an amicable settlement.” It did not address whether there was a gen-
eral obligation to bargain in good faith under international law or whether the 
respondent’s failure to answer the letters constituted a breach of a “good faith” 
bargaining obligation. Tradex Helles S.A. v. Albania, No. ARB/94/2, 14 ICSID 
REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 161, 182–84 (1999). 
 157. See Christoph Schreuer, Traveling the BIT Route: Of Waiting Periods, 
Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the Road, 5 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 231, 231–
39 (2004) (discussing several cases in which the respective presiding tribunal 
elected not to enforce the applicable waiting period). 
 158. See Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, 38 I.L.M 700, 729 (UNCITRAL 1999) 
(permitting arbitration to proceed where an investor waited five days—instead 
of the required six months—to initiate arbitration). 
 159. The only parameter typically provided is a time limit on how long the 
undefined period must continue. See Schreuer, supra note 157, at 232 (quoting 
Article 11 of the German Model BIT wherein the only articulated parameter of 
the waiting period is its duration). 
 160. Factors might include the availability and clarity of  nonbinding dis-
pute resolution mechanisms, a change in corporate ownership or government 
control, the size of the dispute, the ease of redressing the conflict, the public 
perception of the conflict, and the availability of dispute resolution profession-
als to provide effective advice about the process of resolving the conflict and its 
potential implications. 
 161. See ICSID Pending Cases, supra note 100; ICSID, List of Concluded 
Cases, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/conclude.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 
2007) [hereinafter ICSID Concluded Cases] (reflecting settlements in invest-
ment treaty cases such as AES Summit Generation Ltd. v. Hung., Lemire v. 
Ukraine, and Goetz v. Burundi); Onwuamaegbu, supra note 78, at 12 (noting 
the “increasing percentage of ICSID [arbitration] cases that are discontinued 
following settlement”); see also Coe, supra note 78, at 29–30 (commenting on 
the settlement in an ad hoc UNCITRAL arbitration in the Ethyl Corp. v. Can-
ada dispute). 
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influenced by the “amicable resolution” obligation.162 In its cur-
rent format, the process’s efficacy is uncertain. 
b. Difficulties Communicating the Existence of Disputes 
Stakeholders could also use DSD to analyze the efficacy of 
dispute resolution notifications. Theoretically, the process of 
alerting governments to the existence of conflicts or submitting 
an official dispute notice should be straightforward. Neverthe-
less, there are special challenges indigenous to investment 
treaty conflict that should be considered in the design of a sys-
tem. These challenges relate primarily to the structures gov-
ernments may have in place to resolve treaty-related conflict. 
First, although treaties might require investors to provide 
the host government with a dispute notice, they often do not 
specify to whom it should be sent. This lack of clarity can fru-
strate the ability to use first-tier dispute resolution effective-
ly.163 One can easily imagine the frustration of trying to resolve 
a dispute amicably but not knowing whom to contact about be-
ginning or completing that process. 
This problem is compounded where host governments have 
not determined what agencies are responsible for managing in-
vestment treaty conflict.164 Indeed, where the chain of com-
mand has not been specified in advance, it is likely that there 
 
 162. Empirical analysis into this issue would be helpful, particularly if it 
could isolate variables affecting settlement. Factors might include (1) the type 
of the claim, (2) the text of the treaty, (3) the existence of cases involving simi-
lar facts or the same or similar treaty obligations, (4) the relationship between 
the signatories to the treaty, (5) the availability of political risk insurance or 
foreign aid, (6) a change of government, (7) the number of government agen-
cies involved, (8) the nationality or background of the arbitrators, and (9) the 
likely cost of pursuing arbitration and the possibility of shifting the costs. 
 163. See Carlos Ramos Miranda, Legal Issues in the Regulation of Water 
Supply in Mexico, 11 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 75, 81 (2003) (referring to difficulties re-
lated to a lack of clarity with contractual provisions such as dispute resolu-
tion); Linda Stamato, Easier Said Than Done: Resolving Ethical Dilemmas in 
Policy and Practice, 1994 J. DISP. RESOL. 81, 83 (referring to confusion caused 
by a “lack of clarity at the policy level about the goals and benefits of dispute 
resolution processes”); see also Franck, supra note 11, at 1588 n.335 (referring 
to difficulties related to NAFTA’s lack of clarity). 
 164. Cf. Kirk Blackard, Assessing Workplace Conflict Resolution Options, 
DISP. RESOL. J., Feb.–Apr. 2001, at 57, 60 (2001) (suggesting that an effective 
dispute resolution system addresses issues of poor communication); Richard J. 
Erickson, The Making of Executive Agreements by the United States Depart-
ment of Defense: An Agenda for Progress, 13 B.U. INT’L L.J. 45, 84 n.180 (1995) 
(discussing the implications of an inability to create a binding resolution in 
state-to-state disputes). 
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will be internal government conflict about which agency—each 
with different political mandates and objectives—will control 
and pay for the dispute resolution process.165 Tensions can also 
increase when government officials who are not responsible for 
or interested in the dispute rebuff or ignore investors.166 Frus-
tration and other difficulties might also result from investors 
bargaining with officials who lack actual financial, legal, or po-
litical authority to resolve the dispute.167 
A second difficulty involves the role of subnational units. 
Investment treaty conflict can arise as a result of conduct by 
governmental subdivisions such as governors, state assemblies, 
and town councils.168 Where there is poor communication 
among these subdivisions and national units, it may be chal-
lenging to engage in effective dispute resolution prior to the 
submission of a request for arbitration. Dispute notices may be 
mistakenly sent to subdivisions that do not know how to act 
upon them, or a national government may learn of the difficul-
ties for the first time upon receiving a request for arbitration. 
Either of these scenarios will mean that the national govern-
ment cannot utilize first-tier dispute resolution effectively. 
Ultimately these difficulties do not mean that the use of 
dispute notices and nonbinding dispute resolution such as “am-
icable settlement” is inappropriate.169 Rather, using DSD to 
analyze the costs and benefits of these methods would create an 
 
 165. Theoretically, different agencies, such as those in charge of adminis-
tering justice, intergovernmental political affairs, international trade, or a 
specific investment sector (e.g., energy), may be available and interested in 
controlling the resolution of government disputes. 
 166. See Charles N. Brower & Lee A. Steven, Who Then Should Judge?: 
Developing the International Rule of Law Under NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 193, 197 (2001) (observing that the “whims of individual bureaucrats 
may cause a government to downgrade, or even ignore, meritorious claims”). 
 167. See generally Legum, supra note 78 (illustrating the complexity of 
multiple agencies’ simultaneous involvement in settlements); Rubins, supra 
note 78 (noting the factors that affect the ability of government officials to faci-
litate settlement). 
 168. Jeswald Salacuse, Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, Investor-
State Dispute Resolution 11 (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with au-
thor). This may create difficulties for subnational units that may not recognize 
that their conduct may create an international law violation. 
 169. There is literature indicating that mediation and other forms of  non-
binding dispute resolution might be effective in the international context. See, 
e.g., WALTER GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS: CITIZENS’ PROTECTORS IN 
NINE COUNTRIES (1967); RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS: THE THEORY 
AND PRACTICE OF MEDIATION (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 1996). 
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opportunity to ensure that the processes function more effec-
tively for the system’s stakeholders. 
2. Second-Tier Dispute Resolution 
The prevalence of arbitration provisions and the apparent 
structural inclination towards arbitration indicate a presump-
tion that arbitration is the “best” mechanism for resolving trea-
ty disputes.170 Scholars even suggest that countries realized 
“that their self-interest was served by agreeing to arbitrate in-
vestment disputes.”171 
Nevertheless, arbitration is only one of many dispute reso-
lution choices,172 and it “would be a misperception to believe 
that all the disputes related to foreign direct investment can be 
referred to international arbitration.”173 Other dispute resolu-
tion options, binding or nonbinding, may provide critical oppor-
tunities to resolve disputes more efficiently.174 Unfortunately, 
there has been little empirical enquiry into the validity of arbi-
tration’s presumed superiority, let alone a coherent explanation 
of why other dispute resolution systems175 are less desirable.176 
 
 170. The basis for this historical preference is unclear. While not a com-
prehensive or empirical assessment of all international dispute resolution, 
traditional texts appear to extol the benefit of arbitration and appear to refer-
ence more cases being resolved by arbitration than by other formats. See, e.g., 
MERRILLS, supra note 44, at 92–126. 
 171. Alvarez & Park, supra note 110, at 368. 
 172. COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 41, at 37–41; see also Groton, 
supra note 65, at 4 (“Experience has shown that no single dispute resolution 
technique, regardless of how good it is, can be used for all disputes, or for dif-
ferent stages of the same dispute. The causes of disputes come from so many 
different sources and are so complex that there is no ‘one size fits all’ tech-
nique for dispute resolution.”). 
 173. Alfred Escher, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), in LEGAL ASPECTS OF 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 19, at 42. 
 174. The classic formulation is that the “forum [should fit] the fuss.” Sand-
er & Goldberg, supra note 123, at 49. 
 175. Costantino and Merchant identify six broad categories of alternative 
dispute resolution options—namely Preventative, Negotiated, Facilitative, 
Fact-Finding, Advisory, and Imposed ADR. Each category involves varying 
levels of third-party intervention, ranging from heavy involvement to no in-
volvement, and each category has its own distinct costs and benefits. COSTAN-
TINO & MERCHANT, supra note 41, at 37–41. 
 176. This phenomenon may not be unique to investment treaty disputes. 
For example, the OECD recently proposed the use of arbitration to resolve 
disputes arising in connection with international tax treaties. See generally 
CTR. FOR TAX POL’Y & ADMIN., OECD, PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING MECHAN-
ISMS FOR THE RESOLUTION OF TAX TREATY DISPUTES (2006), http://www.oecd 
.org/dataoecd/5/20/36054823.pdf (outlining an arbitration process for resolving 
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a. Understanding the Choice for Arbitration 
The trend towards arbitration, despite its corresponding 
lack of reliance on other effective dispute resolution mechan-
isms,177 is not completely surprising. The first investment trea-
ties were negotiated in the 1960s and 1970s, and many coun-
tries developed model investment treaties around the same 
time that served as the basis for future negotiations.178 Nota-
bly, these paradigms were developed prior to the “ADR Revolu-
tion” in the United States in the 1970s and the development of 
DSD literature in the late 1980s.179 Curiously, even during the 
surge of treaty drafting during the 1990s,180 drafters performed 
little or no analysis of why arbitration is the preferred or ap-
propriate method for resolving disputes. No one justified the 
exclusion of other methods.181 
There are various explanations for this phenomenon. First, 
during the 1980s and 1990s, the resolution of investment treaty 
conflict was largely untested. As a result, there was little evi-
dence that the system was managing conflict inefficiently and 
little need to evaluate the status quo. Second, as countries con-
tinued to negotiate treaties based on established formats for 
 
international tax disputes). But see Allison Christians, Taxing the Global 
Worker: Three Spheres of International Social Security Coordination, 26 VA. 
TAX REV. 81, 118 (2006) (noting the development of “[a] new arbitration me-
chanism” by the OECD, but also mentioning the OECD position “that arbitra-
tion is to be used only in those ‘rare cases’” wherein timely resolution is un-
likely); Michael J. McIntyre, Comments on the OECD Proposal for Secret and 
Mandatory Arbitration of International Tax Disputes, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 622, 
623–47 (2006) (critiquing the OECD’s arbitration proposals).  
 177. See Franck, supra note 13 (discussing the increase in the number of 
investment treaty arbitration awards over time). 
 178. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 34, at 167–253 (providing model 
investment treaties for Austria, Denmark, Germany, Hong Kong, the Nether-
lands, Switzerland, Great Britain, and the United States); UNCTAD, BITs, 
supra note 4 (demonstrating the increase in BITs since 1959). 
 179. Jean R. Sternlight, ADR Is Here: Preliminary Reflections on Where It 
Fits in a System of Justice, 3 NEV. L.J. 289, 289 (2003). It has taken longer for 
the benefits of ADR and DSD to find a home in Europe. David J.A. Cairns, 
Mediating International Commercial Disputes: Differences in U.S. and Euro-
pean Approaches, DISP. RESOL. J., Aug.–Sept. 2005, at 62, 64–68; Francisco 
Orrego Vicuña, Arbitration in a New International Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion System, 18(2) ICSID NEWS (2001), http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/news/ 
n-18-2-1.htm. 
 180. UNCTAD, BITs, supra note 4. 
 181. One likely explanation for this is that dispute resolution theorists and 
investment treaty specialists were not engaged in a dialogue that recognized 
and drew upon their overlapping strengths and interests. This article is in-
tended to be the first step towards promoting a broader dialogue. 
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conflict resolution, institutional momentum likely prevented al-
terations to the traditional format.182 Any departures would 
likely have required significant internal justification.183 Third, 
as the judicialization of investment rights marked a major de-
parture from traditional diplomatic protection, investors may 
have been uncomfortable advocating for a conflict management 
system that might reincorporate aspects of negotiation. With-
out evidence that interest-based methods of dispute resolution 
could be used to successfully resolve disputes with host gov-
ernments, investors may have been unwilling to break new 
ground when millions of dollars were potentially at stake.184 
Fourth, there might have been political disincentive for gov-
ernments to take responsibility for their conduct when it might 
be politically expedient, for example, to hold an arbitral tribun-
al responsible for a particular result.185 
 
 182. See UNCTAD, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 1995–2006: TRENDS 
IN INVESTMENT RULEMAKING at 141, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2006/5, 
U.N. Sales No. E.06.II.D.16 (2007), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ 
iteiia20065_en.pdf (observing the similarity in terms of investment treaties, 
but stating that a “relatively small, but increasing, group of BITs have started 
to introduce some innovations”). 
 183. See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and 
Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 605–
14 (2001) (discussing path dependence in common law systems and observing 
that these can result in legal decisions that are “locked-in” at an early stage). 
 184. Lawyers might be psychologically averse to recommending non-
traditional dispute resolution to clients. Lawyers may be more comfortable 
with arbitration—which has similarities to litigation and other adversarial 
dispute resolution methods taught in law schools. They may be less inclined to 
engage in other methods such as interest-based negotiation, mediation, or 
fact-finding. Lawyers may, for example, have difficulty estimating risk and 
providing advice about processes with which they have less experience. Larger 
financial exposures may magnify this risk and create an incentive for adher-
ence to existing processes that are tried, tested, and capable of facilitating bet-
ter risk assessment. See, e.g., Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 
OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 44–45 (1982) (discussing the lawyer’s “philosophical map”); 
Leonard L. Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer: On the Potential Contributions 
of Mindfulness Meditation to Law Students, Lawyers, and Their Clients, 7 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 16 (2002) (observing that lawyers’ preconceptions, 
experiences, and biases mean they “often miss opportunities for uncovering 
and addressing their clients’ real needs”); see also Chris Guthrie, The Lawyer’s 
Philosophical Map and the Disputant’s Perceptual Map: Impediments to Faci-
litative Mediation and Lawyering, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 145, 149–50 (2001) 
(discussing the characteristics of lawyers and the perceptions of disputants in 
the context of mediation). 
 185. See Todd Allee & Paul K. Huth, Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: In-
ternational Adjudication as Domestic Political Cover, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
219, 219 (2006) (“[L]eaders will seek legal dispute settlement in situations 
where they anticipate sizeable domestic political costs should they attempt to 
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Beyond these practical explanations, there are undoubted-
ly important legal reasons why arbitration is a primary mech-
anism for resolving investment treaty conflict. Arbitration has 
institutional legitimacy because it is associated with a tried 
and tested dispute resolution process.186 The arbitration 
process relies on functioning international law regimes such as 
the New York and ICSID Conventions, which provide stream-
lined enforcement mechanisms.187 Beyond this, a variety of 
practical legal realities—such as the ability to choose neutral 
decision makers with subject matter expertise and an exper-
ienced arbitration bar—made arbitration historically desirable 
in the international commercial context.188 Ultimately, invest-
ment treaty arbitration has resolved disputes, and after ex-
hausting contested awards through the normal legal process, 
parties have generally paid awards.189 These factors cannot and 
should not be discounted. 
b. The Challenge and Costs 
Simply because we can use arbitration does not mean that 
we always should. Just as a physician who diagnoses a patient 
with a heart arrhythmia does not recommend a quadruple by-
pass without considering a range of less intrusive or more effi-
cient options, a different system of resolving investment dis-
putes may effectively address the diagnosed problems with 
fewer complications than arbitration.190 The failure to engage 
 
settle a dispute through the making of bilateral, negotiated concessions.”); Sal-
acuse, supra note 168, at 14 (“[H]ost government officials can blame any unfa-
vorable result on three foreign arbitrators, thereby shifting responsibility 
away from the host government itself.”).  
 186. Other investment-related claims have been successfully resolved using 
international arbitration, including the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal and the Al-
abama Claims Commission. See MERRILLS, supra note 44, at 92–95, 101–03. 
 187. See generally Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517; ICSID Convention, su-
pra note 139. 
 188. The benefits of other aspects of international commercial arbitration 
are less certain in the investment treaty context. It is not clear that invest-
ment treaty arbitration is the most cost-efficient and timely manner of resolv-
ing disputes. Likewise, the confidentiality that is often desirable in the inter-
national commercial context may be a drawback in the investment context 
where public rights granted by public actors are at stake. 
 189. See supra text accompanying notes 52–54. 
 190. UNCTAD observed that the “settlement of any dispute, not just in-
vestment disputes, requires the adoption of the most speedy, informal, amica-
ble and inexpensive method available.” UNCTAD, Recent Developments, supra 
note 9, at 11. Finding the most “appropriate” mechanism for resolving specific 
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in diagnosis and systematic analysis to recalibrate the system 
will have costs. 
Obvious costs relate to process inefficiencies. The presump-
tion that arbitration is the one-size-fits-all model for dispute 
resolution prevents exploration of other options that may be 
speedier, cheaper, or simply better at maximizing party control 
and satisfaction with the process and result.191 Moreover, the 
availability of an arbitration mechanism does not prevent par-
ties from engaging in more traditional dispute resolution, such 
as the exercise of power. For example, in Lemire v. Ukraine, 
Mr. Lemire testified before Congress that, after filing his re-
quest for arbitration, there was “tremendous retaliation . . . [in-
cluding] investigations, and just last week, we had armed 
guards come to our offices as well as—on Friday we had our 
bank accounts frozen. On Thursday of last week, our offices 
were surrounded with armed guards with sub-machine 
guns.”192 
There may also be hidden costs that inhibit conflict resolu-
tion. By placing undue reliance on arbitration, there may be 
categories of simmering conflict that have not become formal 
disputes but are nevertheless important to address. For exam-
ple, unresolved treaty conflicts may provide a disincentive to 
investors considering initial or further investments in the host 
country. Bringing investment arbitration may be cost prohibi-
tive,193 particularly for small investors whose rights have been 
 
categories of types of investment disputes, however, can be challenging. Nev-
ertheless, there are decided benefits to tailoring a dispute resolution design to 
the unique needs of the particular system. These values might include the 
promotion of democratic values, minimizing resources exerted on dispute reso-
lution, increasing productivity, increasing satisfaction with outcomes, decreas-
ing the recurrence of disputes, and improving public relations. E.g., URY ET 
AL., supra note 65, at 169–73; Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute 
Resolution: Systems Design and the New Workplace, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 
11, 13–14 (2005) (discussing the use of dispute resolution mechanisms in the 
modern workplace that foster democratic governance). 
 191. See infra Part IV (identifying the benefits of DSD). 
 192. Foreign Operations, supra note 107; see also id. at 392 (stating a con-
cert manager was “severely beaten in the face when the U.S. government 
stepped in on [Gala Radio’s] behalf . . . [; t]wo days after that, one of our dj’s 
had her flat set on fire,” and providing pictures). 
 193. At present, there is no comprehensive analysis of the actual cost of 
bringing or defending an investment arbitration claim. This is due in part to 
the unavailability of the data necessary for such an analysis—namely a specif-
ic articulation of the parties’ legal costs and the tribunal’s costs and expenses. 
Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence suggests that the costs of these claims are 
not insignificant. See Franck, supra note 11, at 1592 (noting that an invest-
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violated where the arbitration costs may be larger than the po-
tential damages.194 This limitation on a party’s access to dis-
pute resolution is troubling because other mechanisms could 
provide cost-effective redress. This has implications for inves-
tors who are unable to justify bringing a claim or governments 
who face challenges (financial or otherwise) in defending 
claims.195 
Beyond this, arbitration has the capacity to exclude those 
impacted by the result from the dispute resolution process. This 
can have serious ramifications. Members of the public who feel 
disenfranchised—whether they are unable to participate in the 
proceedings, attend the proceedings, or have access to the un-
derlying documents—may respond in ways that increase the 
social, political, or economic costs of conflict.196 This can serve 
 
ment treaty claim may cost $1 million per year and gathering comments sug-
gesting that costs could be in the $1–4 million range); see also UNCTAD, DIS-
PUTES, supra note 9, at 8–10 (observing that a “cursory review of cost decisions 
in recent awards suggests that the average legal costs incurred by Govern-
ments are between $1 million and $2 million, including lawyers’ fees, the costs 
for the tribunal [are] about $400,000 or more, and the costs for the claimants 
. . . are about the same as those for the defendant,” and observing that the in-
vestor in Metalclad spent $4 million in bringing its claim and the Czech gov-
ernment has spent nearly $17 million in two years defending claims); Franck, 
supra note 13 (discussing the tribunal’s average costs and expenses and the 
amount of the parties’ legal costs, while acknowledging the limited nature of 
the empirical data). 
 194. The decision to bring a claim is in the hands of investors who may 
bring a claim irrespective of the economic benefit. In litigation related to an 
investment treaty arbitration, a party brought a claim before a New York 
court to enforce a $23.35 million arbitration award even though there were 
only five cents in an account to secure the debt. CME Media Enters. B.V. v. 
Zelezny, No. 01-CV-1733-DC, 2001 WL 1035138, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 
2001). 
 195. See Eric Gottwald, Leveling the Playing Field: Is It Time for a Legal 
Assistance Center for Developing Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration?, 22 
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 237, 250–60 (2007) (providing evidence of the difficulties 
host governments can face when defending investment treaty claims, such as 
access to the law, due to a lack of financial resources and basic infrastructure). 
 196. As a result of concerns related to the lack of transparency in arbitra-
tion, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have advocated reforms to in-
crease public access to information. See generally HOWARD MANN, PRIVATE 
RIGHTS, PUBLIC PROBLEMS: A GUIDE TO NAFTA’S CONTROVERSIAL CHAPTER 
ON INVESTOR RIGHTS (2001), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/ 
trade_citizensguide.pdf. Some inroads have been made on this issue. Franck, 
supra note 6, at 87–88. Two countries, the United States and Canada, have 
changed their model investment treaties to permit public access under appro-
priate circumstances. Id. at 91. Meanwhile, ICSID changed its arbitration 
rules to permit public access in limited circumstances. ICSID CONVENTION 
RULES, supra note 83, at 115, 117, 122 (permitting the attendance and sub-
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as a magnet for social or political unrest and possibly affect the 
case outcome. 
In Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, United States and Spanish 
investors claimed there was an expropriation of their conces-
sion to provide water and sewer services in Cochabamba, Boli-
via.197 As a result of the public interest and protests related to 
the case, more than three hundred organizations from forty-
three countries asked to participate but were denied.198 Interest 
groups put pressure on the investor to drop the case, complain-
ing about these “secretive” proceedings.199 The case eventually 
settled200 without the investors receiving compensation from 
Bolivia.201 
IV.  THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF DSD   
Concerns about efficacy, transparency, consistency, fair-
ness, and regulatory authority of the current two-tier approach 
are unlikely to be ameliorated just by choosing a different dis-
pute resolution system. Without careful consideration, the 
 
missions by non-parties under limited circumstances and permitting publica-
tion of extracts of awards under Arbitration Rules 32(2), 37(2), and 48(4), ef-
fective April 10, 2006); ICSID ADDITIONAL FACILITY RULES, supra note 83, at 
61–62, 67 (describing Rules 39(2), 41(3), and 53). There are nevertheless inter-
esting contradictions. For example, under the ICSID Rules, a member of the 
public may attend a hearing, but she cannot obtain a transcript without con-
sent of both parties. See id. at 40, 42 (permitting persons other than the par-
ties to attend hearings under Article 34, but Article 39 makes no mention of 
the availability of reports to nonparties). 
 197. See OLIVERA WITH LEWIS, supra note 60 (referring to negotiations dur-
ing Bolivia’s “Water Wars”). 
 198. Petition to the Arbitral Tribunal, La Coordinadora para la Defensa del 
Agua y Vida, No. ARB/02/3 (Aug. 29, 2002), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ 
Aguaaboliviapetition.pdf; Franck, supra note 6, at 90 n.163; Letter from Prof. 
David F. Caron, President of the Tribunal in the Matter of Aguas del Tunari v. 
Bolivia, to J. Martin Wagner, Director, Int’l Program, Earthjustice (Jan. 29, 
2003), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Aguas-BoliviaResponse 
.pdf. 
 199. See generally Press Release, Ctr. for Int’l Envtl. Law, Secretive World 
Bank Tribunal Bans Public and Media Participation in Bechtel Lawsuit over 
Access to Water (Feb. 12, 2003), http://www.ciel.org/Ifi/Bechtel_Lawsuit_ 
12Feb03.html; Jim Shultz, Bechtel Vs. Bolivia: The People Win!!, THE DEMOC-
RACY CENTER ON-LINE, Jan. 19, 2006, http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0601/ 
S00159.htm. 
 200. ICSID Concluded Cases, supra note 161; see also Hamilton & Roch-
werger, supra note 130, at 23 (noting that a foreign investor “eventually 
dropped the [ICSID] case against Guyana in light of continued public opposi-
tion”). 
 201. Press Release, Bechtel, Cochabamba Water Dispute Settled (Jan. 19, 
2006), http://www.bechtel.com/newsarticles/487.asp. 
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same issues may simply manifest themselves in a different fa-
shion. Purifying the waters of investment-related conflict 
should be the goal. Systematic diagnosis through DSD is a tool 
to begin this process. 
In the same way that a one-size-fits-all dispute resolution 
system may be inappropriate, it is possible that using DSD to 
manage conflict and create disputing systems might not be ap-
propriate for all situations.202 Prior to making that individu-
alized determination, however, it would be prudent to consider 
the general costs and benefits of using DSD to manage invest-
ment treaty-related conflict. 
A. BENEFITS 
DSD can benefit the management of investment treaty con-
flict. First, the objective of DSD is to improve the quality and 
efficiency of the process of resolving disputes.203 In the context 
of investment treaty disputes, this can occur through consider-
ing the types of disputes likely to arise under the treaty, im-
proving the process’s efficiency once disputes are formalized by 
tailoring the design to meet the system’s unique needs, and 
managing conflict before disputes crystallize. These steps may 
provide opportunities to assist UNCTAD’s objective of streng-
thening institutional capacities to manage investor-state dis-
putes in a more cost-effective manner.204 
1. Efficient Administration of Existing Disputes 
Past experience in the domestic and multinational context 
suggests that once a formal dispute exists, DSD can provide 
opportunities to decrease the social, political, and financial 
costs of managing conflict.205 In the investment context, the 
benefits may be as simple as (1) paying decreased attorneys 
fees, (2) eliminating the need to pay arbitrators for their servic-
es, (3) permitting investors to focus on their core business activ-
 
 202. See STITT, supra note 43, at 9 (recognizing that dispute resolution is 
often an individual process and that “cookie-cutter” solutions can be inappro-
priate). 
 203. See id. (describing that ADR system design values cost efficiency); 
COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 41, at 46 (listing the six principles of 
DSD); URY ET AL., supra note 65, at 42–46 (describing the six principles of 
DSD and providing examples). 
 204. UNCTAD, DISPUTES, supra note 9, at 61. 
 205. See supra notes 67–77 and accompanying text (identifying the histori-
cal evolution of DSD). 
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ities, (4) letting governments focus upon the process of govern-
ing their citizens, and (5) increasing party control to create so-
lutions that enhance satisfaction with the result. 
While the first four are straightforward, the fifth benefit 
can be demonstrated by example. Lemire v. Ukraine involved a 
dispute about radio broadcasting.206 Ukraine did pay damages, 
but it promised to (1) “examine the quality of broadcasting . . . 
[and] take necessary, reasonable among others, technical 
measures to remove the obstacles (if any) for radio broadcasting 
of Gala Radio” and (2) use its “best possible efforts to consider 
in a positive way the application of Gala Radio to provide it 
with the licenses for radio frequencies.”207 A solution address-
ing the station’s broadcasting needs is not surprising because 
the conflict was about the station’s capacity to broadcast. 
The final aspect of the settlement was a bit more unusual. 
Ukraine also promised to provide “three locations for the beau-
ty salon.”208 At first blush, it is unclear what, if anything, beau-
ty salons have to do with a radio broadcasting investment.209 
Nevertheless, this term of the settlement agreement permitted 
the parties to achieve their shared underlying interests. Per-
haps more interestingly, this creative solution was within the 
parties’ control. It is unlikely that courts or arbitral tribunals 
could order relief on matters beyond the scope of the dispute ar-
ticulated in the pleadings.210 
 
 206. Lemire v. Ukraine, 15 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 530 (2000), 
available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Lemire-Award.pdf. 
 207. Id. at 535–36. 
 208. Id. at 536. 
 209. While the confidential nature of the case makes it difficult to deter-
mine, Mr. Lemire’s congressional testimony suggests that there is a relation-
ship between his enterprises and the Oksana Baiul Beauty Salons. See For-
eign Operations, supra note 107, at 391 (observing that Lemire is affiliated 
with Olympic Champions, Ltd., which has involvement with Oksana Baiul and 
a beauty salon that Mr. Lemire alleged was “completely expropriated in Janu-
ary of 1997 after refusing to pay a bribe”). If this relationship exists and the 
beauty salons were related to his larger foreign investment strategy (i.e., “deal 
swapping” one investment for another), this presumably explains part of the 
settlement terms. 
 210. After this Article was drafted, Lemire initiated another ICSID arbi-
tration against Ukraine. Lemire v. Ukraine, No. ARB/06/18, available at IC-
SID Pending Cases, supra note 100, at 31. Commentary suggests the case in-
volves alleged breaches of the previous settlement agreement as well as new 
breaches of the U.S./Ukraine BIT. Luke Eric Peterson, US Investor Invokes 
BIT to Sue Ukraine over Broadcasting Quotas and Licensing, INVESTMENT 
TREATY NEWS (Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., Winnipeg, Manitoba, Can.), 
Oct. 13, 2006, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itn_oct13_2006.pdf; see also Lemire 
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Building procedural opportunities to capitalize on other 
types of dispute resolution—such as the negotiation in Le-
mire—could be useful. There is some institutional support in 
place to facilitate access to non-arbitration-based dispute reso-
lution. For instance, ICSID has a conciliation facility,211 but it 
has only been used six times.212 Counsel for ICSID notes that 
“the Centre has recently begun to remind parties of the exis-
tence of the [conciliation] mechanism.”213 ICSID also has a fact-
finding facility,214 which has never been used since its inception 
 
v. Ukraine, No. ARB/06/18, available at ICSID Pending Cases, supra note 100, 
at 31. Planting the seeds of later conflict in the resolution of an initial dispute 
is not unique to investment treaty conflict. Occidental Exploration & Produc-
tion Co. v. Ecuador resulted in an arbitration award. Occidental Exploration & 
Prod. Co. v. Ecuador, No. UN 3467, 2004 WL 3267260, at *72–74 (UNCITRAL 
July 1, 2004). Conflict has arisen about that particular case, and Occidental 
filed a new claim. See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Ecuador, No. ARB/06/11, 
Decision on Provisional Measures, available at http://www.worldbank 
.org/icsid/cases/pdf/Occidental_Decision_on_Provisional_Measures_August_ 
17_2007.pdf; ICSID Pending Cases, supra note 100. 
 211. ICSID CONVENTION RULES, supra note 83, at 12. ICSID’s conciliation 
functions like a  nonbinding arbitration or highly formalized, evaluative medi-
ation. The Conciliation Commission has powers to (1) at any time, “recom-
mend that the parties accept specific terms of settlement or that they re-
frain . . . from specific acts that might aggravate the dispute [and] point out to 
the parties the arguments in favor of its recommendations,” (2) request writ-
ten statements from the parties, (3) rule on its own jurisdiction, (4) rule on re-
quests to disqualify conciliators, (5) hold hearings and take evidence in the 
form of documents or witness testimony, and (6) issue a report at the closure 
of the proceedings. Id. at 89–97. 
 212. ICSID has only registered six conciliations: (1) Shareholders of SE-
SAM v. Central African Republic, No. CONC/07/01, (2) SEDITEX Eng’g Bera-
tungsgesellschaft für die Textilindustrie m.b.H. v. Madagascar, No. 
CONC/82/1, (3), Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. Trinidad and Tobago, No. 
CONC/83/1, (4) SEDITEX Eng’g Beratungsgesellschaft für die Textilindustrie 
m.b.H. v. Madagascar, No. CONC/94/1, (5) TG World Petroleum Ltd. v. Niger, 
No. CONC/03/1, and (6) Togo Electricité v. Togo, No. CONC/05/1). ICSID 
Pending Cases, supra note 100; ICSID Concluded Cases, supra note 161; see 
also Onwuamaegbu, supra note 78, at 13–14 (noting the limited use of ICSID’s 
conciliation mechanism). Given the confidential nature of ICSID’s docket, 
these may not all be investment treaty cases. 
 213. Onwuamaegbu, supra note 78, at 13. 
 214. ICSID, Additional Facility Rules for the Administration of Concilia-
tion, Arbitration, and Fact-Finding Proceedings, at vi (Jan. 2003), http:// 
worldbank.com/icsid/facility-archive/facility-en.htm [hereinafter, ICSID Fact-
Finding]. Either an investor or a government can initiate a fact-finding pro-
ceeding to examine and report on facts. ICSID ADDITIONAL FACILITY RULES, 
supra note 83, at 16. Provided both parties consent, a committee will be estab-
lished to provide the parties with an impartial assessment of facts which, if 
accepted by them, resolve a conflict about specific factual issues. See id. at 16–
18; ICSID Fact-Finding, supra. The Rules envisage that there will be oral pro-
ceedings, written submissions, evidence, witness testimony, and a report that 
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in 1978.215 Parties may hesitate to use relatively untried or rel-
atively untested dispute resolution mechanisms. ICSID, how-
ever, currently lacks a facility to promote the use of negotia-
tion, mediation (whether through the use of ombuds or 
otherwise), or other nonbinding dispute resolution processes.216 
Making parties aware of and improving the existing facili-
ties are part of the challenge of designing useful dispute sys-
tems.217 There may also be challenges in providing access to in-
stitutions or convincing parties to use other dispute resolution 
processes that may not be associated with existing institu-
tions.218 Other challenges may involve educating stakeholders 
about the value of other forms of dispute resolution, including 
interest-based dispute resolution, and providing training to 
lawyers and parties about how to utilize each option effectively. 
DSD provides an opportunity to maximize efficiency and stake-
holder satisfaction by assessing the suitability of dispute reso-
lution options based upon the nature of conflicts and the unique 
context of the system’s stakeholders. 
 
“shall be limited to findings of fact [and] shall not contain any recommenda-
tions to the parties nor shall it have the character of an award,” and the par-
ties will be “entirely free as to the effect to be given to the Report.” ICSID AD-
DITIONAL FACILITY RULES, supra note 83, at 20–22. 
 215. Onwuamaegbu, supra note 78, at 13. 
 216. See ICSID ADDITIONAL FACILITY RULES, supra note 83, at 5 (noting 
that ICSID only has facilities for arbitration, conciliation, and fact-finding). 
 217. In the 1982 and 1983 U.S. Model BITs, there were references to using 
ICSID’s fact-finding facility. Model Treaty Between the United States of 
America and [Country] Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protec-
tion of Investments, U.S.-[Country], art. VII(2), Jan. 11, 1982, reprinted in 
KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICY 
AND PRACTICE app. A-1 (1992); Model Treaty Between the United States of 
America and [Country] Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protec-
tion of Investment, U.S.-[Country], art. VII(2), Jan. 21, 1983, reprinted in 
VANDEVELDE, supra, at app. A-2. Interestingly this “explicit reference was 
omitted as unnecessary from the 1984 and 1987 drafts.” VANDEVELDE, supra, 
at 165. 
 218. There might be utility in encouraging stakeholders to consider using 
other forms of binding dispute resolution with transparent procedures and the 
possibility of enforcement. This might involve recourse to a national court or 
an international claims commission. See Franck, supra note 6, at 81–82 n.130; 
W. Michael Reisman, Control Mechanisms in International Dispute Resolu-
tion, 2 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 129, 136–37 (1994); see also Bjorklund, supra note 131, 
at 825–27 (describing the use of mixed claims commissions). 
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2. Early Management of Conflict 
There are benefits to instituting early, preventative conflict 
management.219 DSD can be used to normalize conflict and in-
stitute measures that prevent its escalation. A redesigned sys-
tem might create a process that provides “early warning signs” 
to prevent the escalation of disputes.220 
Some commentators suggest that once a conflict has esca-
lated and investors submit a request for arbitration, there is no 
turning back.221 Governments dig in their heels and refuse to 
settle, lest there be political fall-out in the future.222 Using DSD 
to provide early intervention that normalizes conflict manage-
ment may depoliticize the dispute resolution, promote legitima-
cy, and provide early opportunities for both investors and gov-
ernments to come to mutually acceptable positions. 
For instance, there might be utility in setting up an om-
buds office to act as a complaint center.223 Ombuds traditional-
ly use a variety of tools to resolve complaints at an early stage 
and have historically been used effectively in dealing with pub-
lic-private disputes.224 They might direct constituents to other 
processes or opportunities that may resolve the issues; like-
wise, they may raise the problem at an appropriate level within 
the organization.225 
 
 219. COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 41, at 38–39; STITT, supra note 
43, at 2, 10; URY ET AL., supra note 65, at 61, 170–72. 
 220. See STITT, supra note 43, at 10 (“An organization need not, however, 
wait until it is in distress to look for an appropriate dispute resolution. The 
best time, in fact, for organizations to look at systems design is before a crisis 
has arisen, when conflict has not yet manifested itself.”). 
 221. See Coe, supra note 78, at 29, 41; Legum, supra note 78, at 25 (“[T]he 
best chance to resolve a dispute between a foreign investor and a government 
agency is likely before the investment dispute becomes a dispute under an in-
vestment treaty.”). 
 222. See Legum, supra note 78, at 24. 
 223. Karl Sauvant, Mediation Is the Key for Future Investment, FDI, Apr. 2, 
2002, http://www.fdimagazine.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/108/Mediation_is_ 
the_key_for_future_investment.html.  
 224. Philip J. Harter, Ombuds: A Voice for the People, DISP. RESOL. MAG. 
Winter 2005, at 5, 5–6; Harold J. Krent, Federal Agency Ombuds: The Costs, 
Benefits and Countenance of Confidentiality, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 17, 18, 20–22 
(2000). See generally GELLHORN, supra note 169 (setting out how nine differ-
ent countries have effectively used ombuds). 
 225. An ombud is an “officer appointed by the legislature to handle com-
plaints against administrative and judicial action,” serving as a watchdog over 
those actions while exercising independence, expertise, impartiality, accessi-
bility, and powers of persuasion rather than control. Shirley A. Wiegand, A 
Just and Lasting Peace: Supplanting Mediation with the Ombuds Model, 12 
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Ombuds offices have the benefit of equality where those 
who are affected by a conflict have a place to give voice to their 
concerns.226 Unlike an investor’s unilateral right to bring 
claims to arbitration, investors, citizens, and governmental offi-
cials could have theoretical access to the ombuds office for the 
filing of complaints.227 This option might also provide practical 
benefits by offering a clear line of authority for receiving com-
plaints, providing governmental authority for managing dis-
putes, and lowering the cost of raising issues. This has the ben-
efit of clarifying communication lines and permitting smaller 
investors to be heard or smaller conflicts to be addressed. It al-
so facilitates access to justice and decreases the stigma of an-
nouncing and quickly resolving disputes.228 Rather than letting 
problems fester or creating an intractable dispute, an ombud 
provides an official channel that permits stakeholders to ad-
dress issues informally before ratcheting up the cost and for-
mality of conflict resolution.229 For governments, such an office 
creates opportunities to assess and address potential litigation 
risks—correcting problems before they worsen—or making in-
formed determinations about how best to manage their policy 
choices. For investors, early intervention might provide oppor-
tunities to resolve disputes before having to allocate resources 
 
OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 95, 98 (1996). Other international law scholars have 
also pointed to the importance of a mechanism of this kind. See Sauvant, su-
pra note 223 (“One option to consider is the establishment of an office of in-
vestment mediation, to deal with complaints before they turn into conflicts of a 
sort that only courts can resolve. The idea is similar to that of an ombudsper-
son.”). 
 226. There is evidence that those experiencing disputes seek to voice their 
conflict regardless of whether there is a legally cognizable claim. Kathy L. 
Cerminara, Contextualizing ADR in Managed Care: A Proposal Aimed at Eas-
ing Tensions and Resolving Conflict, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 547, 587 (2002). This 
suggests a greater concern for communication than a denial of legal rights.  
 227. An ombuds office could serve as a conflict barometer. It would alert 
governments to where they are most likely to encounter difficulties; with that 
information, governments will be in a position to make more informed and ra-
tional legislative and regulatory choices. Ombuds might also enhance govern-
mental legitimacy. While ombuds cannot traditionally make government poli-
cy, the existence of the office may encourage government officials to support 
decisions with clear reasons. Moreover, providing the regulated public with a 
direct form of communication and feedback can promote democratic values 
and institutional legitimacy. There would, undoubtedly, be important costs to 
using ombuds; DSD might usefully consider who best to use this approach. 
 228. While theoretically it could increase the number of recorded disputes, 
this might not mean an increased number of actual disputes but rather an in-
creased reporting of conflict. 
 229. Wiegand, supra note 225, at 119–21. 
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to dispute resolution instead of core commercial activities. For 
citizens, it offers an opportunity to voice their concerns. 
This type of model is not completely unknown in the inter-
national context. The Commission for Environmental Coopera-
tion was designed to help prevent the escalation of potential 
trade and environmental conflicts related to NAFTA.230 Some-
thing similar may be worth exploring for investment disputes. 
Such a model need not exclude access to arbitration, as the use 
of ombuds could take various forms. Ombuds might theoretical-
ly provide an exclusive dispute resolution mechanism. More 
probably, use of ombuds might complement the arbitration 
process where it could either be a precondition to arbitration or 
used simultaneously with arbitration. Ultimately, the prin-
ciples upon which stakeholders agree to organize dispute reso-
lution will determine how to use ombuds (if at all). Neverthe-
less, the benefits of using ombuds to manage conflict at an 
early stage are promising. 
3. Procedural Justice and Institutional Legitimacy 
Beyond these efficiency measures, there are systematic 
benefits to engaging in DSD. In particular, reevaluation of the 
system through DSD can enhance its institutional legitimacy 
and promote procedural justice. 
There is a need for procedural fairness in terms of how the 
dispute resolution process is created.231 Empirical evidence 
suggests that when stakeholders believe a system is procedu-
rally just, they are more likely to buy into the result and the 
 
 230. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-
Can.-Mex., art. 10(6)(c), Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480; Comm’n for Envtl. Co-
operation, Who We Are, http://www.cec.org/who_we_are/index.cfm? 
varlan=english (last visited Oct. 17, 2007) (providing basic information about 
the Commission for Environmental Cooperation); see also David. L. Markell, 
Understanding Citizen Perspectives on Government Decision Making Processes 
as a Way to Improve the Administrative State, 36 ENVTL. L. 651, 659 (2006) 
(analyzing the Commission for Environmental Cooperation and citizen partic-
ipation and the implications for procedural justice). 
 231. See Lisa B. Bingham, Control over Dispute-System Design and Man-
datory Commercial Arbitration, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 
2004, at 221, 251 (referring to the importance of the conflict resolution system 
design); Lisa B. Bingham, Self-Determination in Dispute System Design and 
Employment Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 873, 907 (2002) (suggesting the 
importance of stakeholder participation in the design of a dispute resolution 
system); Nancy A. Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness in Negotiation, in NEGOTIA-
TOR’S FIELDBOOK, supra note 3, at 165, 170 (outlining the potential benefits of 
procedural fairness). 
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process, comply with the outcome, comply with the law in the 
future, increase commitment to the organization, accord respect 
and loyalty to the institution, and perceive the system to be le-
gitimate.232 This evidence indicates that the trust in the legal 
institution can be more influential than even substantive cor-
rectness in determining whether parties will comply with the 
law.233 
It is useful to consider how best to use these empirical find-
ings to enhance procedural justice.234 Various approaches have 
been shown to enhance perceptions of procedural justice, such 
as (1) creating chances for the parties to provide input into the 
process of resolving disputes, (2) providing an opportunity to 
voice each party’s views and concerns, (3) having a third party 
consider a party’s views and concerns, and (4) ensuring that 
both the process and the third party treat a party in a dignified 
and respectful manner.235 
 
 232. TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS: PRO-
CEDURAL JUSTICE, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT 77–80 
(2000); see also JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 94 (1975) (arguing that the process used in resolv-
ing a dispute strongly influences the disputants’ level of satisfaction with the 
ultimate resolution); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 82, 107–08 
(1990) (reporting research demonstrating that people who are confident that 
decision-making procedures are fair are more likely to obey the law); Jeanne 
M. Brett & Stephen B. Goldberg, Grievance Mediation in the Coal Industry: A 
Field Experiment, 37 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 49, 65, 67–68 (1983) (suggesting 
that parties value process control because they view it as a means of control-
ling outcome); William M. O’Barr & John M. Conley, Lay Expectations of the 
Civil Justice System, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 137, 137 (1988) (“We find litigants 
are at least as concerned with issues of process as they are with the substan-
tive questions that make up their cases.”); John T. Scholz, Contractual Com-
pliance and the Federal Income Tax System, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 139, 
176–77 (2003) (discussing an empirical analysis that confirms that procedural 
justice plays a strong role in a party’s willingness to comply with a decision). 
These studies may, however, be of limited generalizability as the samples and 
methodologies do not analyze investment treaty disputes or the management 
of international conflicts. 
 233. Tom R. Tyler, Public Mistrust of the Law: A Political Perspective, 66 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 847, 856–60, 867–70 (1998); see also RISKIN ET AL., supra note 3, 
at 808 (suggesting that people are more willing to comply with the law when it 
is perceived to be legitimate and deserving of compliance, and the primary as-
pect of legitimacy is perceived procedural fairness and trust in legal authori-
ties). 
 234. The empirical research was not conducted in the investment treaty 
context and its external validity may therefore be limited. Future studies, 
however, might conduct procedural justice research to address this issue. 
 235. Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What’s 
Justice Got to Do with It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 788–95 (2001); see also Stefan 
Machura, Introduction: Procedural Justice, Law and Policy, 20 LAW & POL’Y 1, 
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DSD can utilize these elements to enhance legitimacy and 
promote procedural justice on multiple levels. First, DSD de-
signers might invite those affected by conflict—investors or 
governments and their citizens—to have a voice in creating the 
process of resolving disputes. This might advance democratic 
values236 and enhance perceived procedural justice.237 Second, 
the design that is ultimately created can incorporate disputing 
systems that are most likely to provide those parties with 
choice and a voice, as well as offering dignity and respect. 
Irrespective of whether change is implemented, a transpar-
ent evaluation process can strengthen institutional credibili-
ty.238 It sends a message that the system is not static. Rather, 
it can be open to critique and improvement that enhances qual-
ity and improves satisfaction for those directly or indirectly af-
fected by treaty-related conflict. All of these factors are likely to 
enhance the credibility of the disputing process and promote its 
long-term stability. 
B. COSTS 
There are, however, potential downsides to using DSD to 
resolve investment treaty conflict. 
1. Appropriateness of a DSD Model 
Some might suggest that using DSD to analyze and select 
a dispute resolution process is unnecessary. Rather, because 
these critics might believe that only one form of dispute resolu-
tion is ever appropriate, DSD would seem an unwarranted 
waste of resources. As the boundaries of substantive treaty 
 
3–4, 6–7 (1998) (reviewing empirical research on the effect of procedural jus-
tice and observing that parties are more likely to accept unfavorable outcomes 
and remain committed to a group if they have participated in the decisions, 
the process recognizes their status in the group, and authorities appear to be 
neutral and benevolent in application). 
 236. Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem 
of Arbitration, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 279, 295; 
Andrea K. Schneider, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: Individual Rights in 
International Trade Organizations, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 587, 625–29 
(1998). 
 237. E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCE-
DURAL JUSTICE 208–09 (1988). 
 238. There is also a benefit “from considering whether there may be more 
appropriate ways to resolve disputes. Even if no process is found that can im-
prove the existing structures, the exercise of considering appropriate processes 
will still help an organization assess its sources of its conflict, and may lead to 
a better understanding of the conflict.” STITT, supra note 43, at 10. 
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rights are still being sketched and implicate public policy, tak-
ing a page from Owen Fiss’s classic critique,239 these commen-
tators might suggest that mechanisms other than public adju-
dication are inappropriate.240 
This position ignores the possibility that utilization of DSD 
methods may result in the creation of a system that only uses 
public adjudication. If that were the case, the systematic analy-
sis leading to this recommendation would provide enhanced 
public trust in the resulting mechanism. Moreover, a single 
dispute resolution mechanism is rarely a silver bullet. Limiting 
parties to a single forum may prevent parties from using a mu-
tually satisfactory process to resolve a conflict in a mutually ac-
ceptable way. 
2. Generalizability of a DSD Model 
There may be important challenges related to the generali-
zability of DSD to manage conflict.241 In particular, there may 
be important differences amongst legal cultures, dispute reso-
lution traditions, and economic and political contexts that make 
the utilization of DSD approaches untenable or, at a minimum, 
more challenging.242 Undoubtedly, cultural, psychological, eco-
 
 239. Fiss, supra note 3, at 1085–90. 
 240. These advocates might be arbitration rejectors advocating a return of 
disputes to public forums. See Franck, supra note 11, at 1594–1601. 
 241. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Correspondences and Contradictions in 
International and Domestic Conflict Resolution: Lessons from General Theory 
and Varied Contexts, 2003 J. DISP. RESOL. 319, 325 (“Exportation of ADR 
techniques and theories must be culturally and politically sensitive to the host 
nations or cultures . . . .”); Wallace Warfield, Response to Carrie Menkel-
Meadow’s “Correspondences and Contradictions in International and Domestic 
Conflict Resolution: Lessons from General Theory and Varied Contexts,” 2003 
J. DISP. RESOL. 417, 417–18 (questioning whether Western approaches to con-
flict resolution are generalizable to other cultures or simply reflect unique, 
nontransferable values and methodologies). 
 242. See JEANNE M. BRETT, NEGOTIATING GLOBALLY: HOW TO NEGOTIATE 
DEALS, RESOLVE DISPUTES, AND MAKE DECISIONS ACROSS CULTURAL BOUN-
DARIES 203–09 (2001); Julie Ann Gold, ADR Through a Cultural Lens: How 
Cultural Values Shape Our Disputing Processes, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 289, 
317–20; see also BRISHKAI LUND ET AL., CONFLICT AND CULTURE: REPORT OF 
THE MULTICULTURALISM AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROJECT 26–27 (1994) 
(discussing the importance of individualist and collectivist dimensions in de-
signing and providing conflict resolution programs or training); Cohen, supra 
note 155, at 329–32 (discussing difficulties arising from different dispute reso-
lution traditions and high and low context cultures); Ilhyung Lee, The Law 
and Culture of the Apology in Korean Dispute Settlement (With Japan and the 
United States in Mind), 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 9–13 (2005) (analyzing the im-
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nomic, political, and legal contexts may make the DSD inap-
propriate in certain circumstances. Nevertheless, thoughtful 
consideration of what factors may make DSD unsuitable can be 
part of a preliminary diagnosis. 
3. The Challenge of Structuring DSD 
a. A Few Critical Questions 
There will also be challenges related to the specific and 
structured application of DSD principles. There will undoubted-
ly be questions about (1) whether a design should proceed on a 
bilateral or multilateral basis, (2) how designers would be se-
lected and paid, (3) who should be involved in the design 
process, (4) what are the foundational values for a system’s or-
ganization, (5) whether there is an appropriate laboratory for 
DSD and how pilot testing might be conducted, (6) what mech-
anisms will be available for correcting inefficiencies in the new 
system, (7) how stakeholders can be educated to maximize the 
benefits of the newly designed system, (8) whether there is 
something unique about the role of governments or investors in 
this context that may inhibit the benefits of DSD, (9) whether 
the scope of conflict is large enough to justify using DSD, and 
(10) whether the costs of setting up the system would be worth 
the eventual benefits.243 
These are important questions. Nevertheless, these issues 
should not prevent scholars and policymakers from thinking, 
discussing, and analyzing the potential benefits of DSD. In-
stead, these questions are best viewed through a lens that 
opens up the possibility for creative experimentation.244 
 
pact of high and low context cultures and the impact of apology on dispute res-
olution). 
 243. This is not an exclusive list. Future scholarship might usefully sup-
plement and tease out critical sub-issues related to efficient management of 
DSD in the investment treaty context. 
 244. This is not dissimilar to the potential benefits of experimentation 
available through regulatory competition. See Joel P. Trachtman, Institutional 
Linkage: Transcending “Trade And . . . ,” 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 77, 84 (2002) 
(“[P]ressure [of regulatory competition] is expected to lead to regulation that is 
more efficient, that achieves the regulatory goal at less cost; or perhaps to the 
repeal of regulation that does not provide benefits sufficient to justify its 
costs.”); Joel P. Trachtman, International Regulatory Competition, Externali-
zation, and Jurisdiction, 34 HARV. INT’L L.J. 47, 63–70 (1993) (explaining that 
the benefits of multiple legal regimes in transnational law permit regulatory 
experimentation). 
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b. Possible Ways Forward 
Ultimately DSD can be implemented however stakeholders 
wish. That said, one of the most fundamental decisions to be 
made is whether DSD should proceed on a multilateral or bila-
teral basis.245 The answer to this issue is critical as the result-
ing dispute resolution mechanism(s) may vary significantly de-
pending on that single answer. 
i. A Multilateral Approach 
A broad, multilateral approach has certain benefits. First, 
it would offer a uniform and consistent approach to dispute 
resolution, which may decrease the confusion of investors and 
governments alike.246 Second, there may be a possibility of affi-
liating with an established international organization such as 
ICSID to provide a central repository to manage claims.247 
Third, it offers an opportunity to hear and address a broad con-
stituency of stakeholders.248 Fourth, a multilateral implemen-
 
 245. There may be additional subtleties that stakeholders wish to consider. 
Rather than using DSD to create a generalized conflict management process, 
stakeholders may create project- or industry-specific dispute resolution sys-
tems.  
 246. A uniform approach might involve a multilateral treaty based upon 
multilateral consultation. Under this approach, all governments would be sub-
jected to the same obligations and they could look at the text of a single 
agreement to determine their rights and responsibilities. Some might reason-
ably view this as an improvement from having to consider the text of multiple 
treaties to determine the scope of their rights. Similarly, should they be 
granted rights on a multilateral basis, investors need only look towards a sin-
gle document to determine the scope of their rights. Such clarity has the bene-
fit of streamlining the process of advising investors. Not all investors, howev-
er, may view such clarity as an advantage as it may not provide the current 
flexibility. 
 247. See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NA-
TIONS 87–88 (1990); see also THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 41–46 (1995) (discussing the benefit of “adherence” to 
established international and institutional norms). The World Bank has a cer-
tain status as a critical lending institution to promote economic development 
and ICSID likewise has a reputation as a key arbitral institution. See MARTIN 
A. WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE WORLD BANK’S INTERNATIONAL DE-
VELOPMENT ASSOCIATION (IDA) 2–3 (2007), available at http://fpc.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/84308.pdf; Antonio R. Parra, ICSID and the Rise of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties: Will ICSID Be the Leading Arbitration Institu-
tion in the Early 21st Century?, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 41, 42–43 (2000). 
But see ICSID, Bolivia Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Con-
vention, May 16, 2007, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/05-16-07 
.htm (indicating that Bolivia is withdrawing from ICSID). 
 248. Acting on a broad, multilateral basis creates an opportunity to secure 
input from a broad group of perspectives including different governments (i.e., 
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tation—which results in the creation of a single treaty or a 
DSD Working Group or Advisory Committee249—might be more 
efficient than implementing DSD on a treaty-by-treaty basis 
and amending around 2500 individual treaties. As a practical 
matter, however, a multilateral approach would need to ad-
dress investment conflict on a global scale. Likewise, it would 
need to offer broad solutions to address the mutual needs of 
stakeholders with different political, economic, cultural, and le-
gal traditions. 
ii. A Bilateral Approach 
The costs of a multilateral approach translate into a signif-
icant benefit for a bilateral approach. Because it addresses the 
lowest common denominators of countries with different tradi-
tions, a multilateral approach may create a race to the bottom. 
Rather than having the flexibility that comes from a tailor-
made process, a multilateral approach may ultimately only 
create a narrow, rigid, and unrefined range of acceptable op-
tions. 
A system focused instead on bilateral relationships can ac-
tualize the core benefits of DSD. A bilateral approach permits 
stakeholders to make an accurate assessment of the appro-
priateness of DSD. A contextual application of DSD means the 
proposed dispute resolution process can account for local varia-
tions and needs. This is likely to mean that conflict indigenous 
to its disputing system is managed more effectively. 
While there may be concerns about the splintering of dis-
pute resolution that a bilateral use of DSD might bring, this 
may not prove overwhelming.250 Investors are accustomed to 
 
developing, developed, or transitional economies); different types of investors 
(i.e., different industry sectors, financiers, and insurers); and other NGO pers-
pectives. Including an overly large number of constituents may, however, 
create a cacophony with off-setting inefficiencies. 
 249. This might be similar to the NAFTA Advisory Committee on Private 
Commercial Disputes, which was an advisory committee established to make 
reports and recommendations on the availability, use, and effectiveness of ar-
bitration, mediation, and other procedures for the resolution of private inter-
national commercial disputes. See NAFTA, supra note 29, art. 2022; NAFTA 
ADVISORY COMM. ON PRIVATE COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, NOVEMBER 1996 RE-
PORT OF THE NAFTA ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRIVATE COMMERCIAL DIS-
PUTES TO THE NAFTA FREE TRADE COMMISSION app. A (1996), available at 
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nafta-ALENA/report12-en.asp. 
 250. The challenge of fragmentation of dispute resolution systems may 
simply be a question of degree that can be addressed by the proper balance be-
tween uniformity and diversification. Beyond this, there may be less of a con-
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different processes (both internal and external) for managing 
disputes. While variations may prove challenging for govern-
ments,251 they retain ultimate control over the degree of dis-
pute resolution uniformity and can even factor the need for un-
iformity into their DSD process.252 
One way to begin using DSD would be to encourage treaty 
partners to consider the possibility of DSD opportunities. When 
negotiating treaties in the future, governments might include a 
specific provision to establish a working group to make DSD-
related recommendations, or at the very minimum, they might 
consider establishing a group to consider the utility of the DSD 
process. There is precedent for such an approach.253 In particu-
lar, the 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) in-
cludes an opportunity for treaty partners to consider the possi-
bility of augmenting the existing arbitration mechanism to 
provide for an appellate body.254 Such an approach might also 
provide for fruitful opportunities to consider dispute resolution 
more systematically and create tailor-made mechanisms to ad-
dress their unique needs. 
Many treaties currently in existence have sunset provi-
sions that provide an opportunity for renegotiation of treaty 
 
cern about the fragmentation of the dispute resolution process than there is 
with the fragmentation of the underlying substantive standards of investment 
protections. Fragmentation concerns may be of particular concern in the subs-
tantive arena because diversification in standards are further fragmented by 
the sophistry of interpretation by arbitration tribunals. 
 251. The challenge for governments may be less about managing different 
dispute resolution processes and more about becoming accustomed to being 
publicly accountable for their conduct. For countries without a tradition of 
waiving sovereign immunity, it may be particularly difficult to offer investor-
state dispute resolution if there is no internal infrastructure in place—such as 
the Office of the Legal Advisor at the United States Department of State—to 
defend claims. 
 252. Governments might consider DSD on a unilateral basis. They might 
consider their internal conflicts, needs, and values during the design process. 
Theoretically, this might result in internal domestic legislation to improve the 
performance of managing investment disputes. See, e.g., Salacuse, supra note 
168, at 46–47 (“[H]ost countries might wish to consider enacting legislation 
that specifically authorizes—if not encourages—[government officials] to em-
ploy ADR techniques.”). It also might involve using DSD to create model trea-
ty language that requires adaptation with each trading partner. 
 253. See 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 19, at Annex D. 
 254. See id. (“Within three years after the date of entry into force of the 
Treaty, the Parties shall consider whether to establish a bilateral appellate 
body or similar mechanism to review awards . . . .”). 
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terms in five to ten years.255 Given the increase in the number 
of countries renegotiating treaties,256 government negotiators 
might consider DSD actively. For those forward planners, gov-
ernments might contemplate the utility of revising the dispute 
resolution provisions to address their current and future inter-
ests. Theoretically, the time between now and the sunset may 
permit parties to use DSD to agree upon a modified dispute 
resolution mechanism that is implemented later. 
iii. The Hybrid: A Third Way? 
There is a possible “third way” for using DSD. Countries 
may ultimately prefer to use a centralized set of models—
perhaps created by a group representing a broad constituency 
of stakeholders—but adapt the general approach to meet the 
unique needs of each individual system. This may minimize the 
likelihood of confusion caused by a plethora of radically differ-
ent sets of dispute resolution processes but still provide an op-
portunity for a degree of customization. 
As a practical matter, this latter option may be the most 
realistic scenario as major capital exporting countries (such as 
the United States, The Netherlands, Germany, Canada, and 
France) use Model BITs to begin treaty negotiations.257 Never-
theless, the Australia/United States Free Trade Agreement 
demonstrates that parties can significantly alter their standard 
dispute resolution negotiating strategy should the context war-
rant it.258 
Moreover, to the extent that risk-averse stakeholders wish 
to adhere to tried, tested, and generally accepted models, using 
a prepackaged DSD model may be more politically tenable. 
While there would undoubtedly be variations in the models 
adopted, the degree of uniformity coupled with better tailoring 
would likely be an improvement to the current approach. A 
more uniform approach that allows for reasonable variation 
may also prevent over-fragmentation. Such an outcome for a 
 
 255. See COMEAUX & KINSELLA, supra note 6, at 109; LUCY REED ET AL., 
GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 61–62 (2004). 
 256. See UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements, supra note 4, at 2 
(“The trend towards the renegotiation of existing treaties has continued with 
13 BITs affected in 2005.”). 
 257. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 34, at 167–253 (providing the text 
of various model investment treaties). 
 258. See Dodge, supra note 37, at 22–26 (discussing the Australia/United 
States Free Trade Agreement and NAFTA); Franck, supra note 4, at 359–60. 
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system experiencing substantial variation in the interpretation 
of textually similar rights259 may prove quite useful. 
The choice as to which level to implement DSD, however, is 
ultimately a matter of government discretion and presumably 
an informed exercise of sovereignty. Should governments desire 
greater variety in their dispute resolution obligations, they are 
at liberty to create it. Likewise, should governments prefer to 
trade the benefits of tailor-made dispute resolution for en-
hanced certainty, they can negotiate that outcome.260 
4. Moving Beyond Inertia: A Constituency for Change 
Because it is a systematic shift to the conflict management 
mindset, there will be costs associated with using DSD. Given 
the nature of inertia,261 some force will be required to adjust 
the current approach. There may not be a unified constituency 
to advocate for change. There may be a perception that the 
problems surrounding the investment treaty dispute have 
reached neither a cataclysmic stage nor a “mutually hurting 
stalemate,” where parties become willing to consider new solu-
tions.262 In other words, until the difficulties with the existing 
 
 259. See generally supra notes 11, 80, and accompanying text (discussing 
concerns regarding inconsistency and legitimacy in the current dispute resolu-
tion system). 
 260. Drafters may need to draft around “Most Favored Nations” (MFN) 
clauses. One arbitral tribunal held that an MFN clause requires importation 
of more favorable dispute resolution provisions from other treaties to which 
the respondent is a party. Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, 16 ICSID REV. FOR-
EIGN INV. L.J. 212, 232 (2001), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ 
Maffezini-Jurisdiction-English_001.pdf. Not all tribunals have agreed with 
this approach. See Scott Vessel, Clearing a Path Through a Tangled Jurispru-
dence: Most-Favored-Nation Clauses and Dispute Settlement Provisions in Bi-
lateral Investment Treaties, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 125, 126–27 (2007). To address 
this issue, stakeholders could include clauses that clearly state that MFN pro-
visions do not apply to the dispute resolution mechanism.  
 261. Newton’s first law of motion is that an object at rest tends to stay at 
rest and an object in motion tends to stay in motion with constant velocity un-
less acted upon by a force. ISAAC NEWTON, THE PRINCIPIA 416 (Univ. of Cal. 
Press, 1st ed. 1999) (1687). This law of inertia suggests that some force will be 
required to change the present state of affairs. Cf. id. 
 262. I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, RIPE FOR RESOLUTION: CONFLICT AND INTER-
VENTION IN AFRICA (1989) (explaining how foreign powers can contribute to 
the management and resolution of conflicts in Africa without using military 
force); I. William Zartman, The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stale-
mates and Ripe Moments, in CONTEMPORARY PEACEMAKING: CONFLICT, VI-
OLENCE AND PEACE PROCESSES 19, 19–20, 24, 26 (John Darby & Roger Mac-
Ginty eds., 2003); I. William Zartman, Timing and Ripeness, in NEGOTIATOR’S 
FIELDBOOK, supra note 3, at 143 (explaining the concept of a mutually hurting 
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system reach a point that is unbearable for all stakeholders, 
the system may not be ripe for the use of Dispute Systems De-
sign.263 
a. The Role of Foreign Investors 
Critics might argue that investors have largely been happy 
with the status quo and immediate access to investment treaty 
arbitration.264 Bringing a host government to the table through 
arbitration is a powerful tool. Because it has been used success-
fully in the past to obtain multimillion-dollar awards,265 inves-
tors may have little incentive to change the current process. 
This position may be shortsighted. Over-reliance on arbi-
tration has its own costs. Some investors have begun to speak 
out against the use of arbitration.266 The potentially significant 
arbitration costs, for which the parties may ultimately be re-
sponsible, undoubtedly affect this concern. In several important 
recent arbitration cases, investors have not prevailed and have 
 
stalemate); see also Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Day After Tomorrow: What 
Happens Once a Middle East Peace Treaty Is Signed?, 6 NEV. L.J. 401, 403 
(2006) (discussing Zartman’s theory of ripeness). 
 263. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 241, at 344–45 (discussing the prob-
lem of ripeness in dispute resolution). 
 264. There is not yet an empirical analysis quantifying investors’ subjective 
satisfaction with the arbitration process. Future analysis might consider this 
dimension as treaties provide investors with new procedural rights that inves-
tors might reasonably perceive as desirable. One study suggested that arbitra-
tion has benefits for states and investors. See CLARK, MARTIRE & BARTOLO-
MEO, INC., ICSID: STAKEHOLDER SURVEY (2004), available at http://www 
.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/icsid-client-survey-100904.pdf (surveying par-
ties’ and arbitrators’ views on ICSID, finding favorable ratings for ICSID, and 
reporting that 93% of respondents were “likely” to recommend ICSID dispute 
resolution in the future); see also Stefano E. Cirielli, Arbitration, Financial 
Markets and Banking Disputes, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 243, 274 n.120 (2003) 
(maintaining that, in securities arbitration, investors fare better in arbitration 
proceedings than in the courts); Michael M. Moore, International Arbitration 
Between States and Foreign Investors—The World Bank Convention, 18 STAN. 
L. REV. 1359, 1376 (1966) (suggesting that a history of dissatisfaction with ar-
bitration “is no reason to oppose the creation of facilities for conciliation and 
arbitration of investment disputes to which investors may have access”). 
 265. See, e.g., supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text (describing the 
monetary damages in the Argentina cases). 
 266. For example, Grant Kesler, the former CEO of Metalclad, a company 
that won an investment treaty arbitration, was so dissatisfied with the process 
that he stated he “wished he had merely entrusted his company’s fate to in-
formal mechanisms,” such as various “political options.” Coe, supra note 78, at 
8 & n.2. After having spent approximately five years and approximately $4 
million in legal fees, Kesler opined the process was too slow, costly, and inde-
terminate. Id. at 9–10. 
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been required to pay millions of dollars not just for their own 
legal costs but also the costs of the government and the arbitral 
tribunal.267 
Not unlike the situation at the Caney Creek mine, invest-
ment treaty arbitration is subject to rising costs and lengthy 
delays. Investors might be best served by looking for ways to 
address those issues. In other words, there are aspects of the 
current system that may not be in an investor’s long-term 
commercial interests. DSD could offer an opportunity to accen-
tuate the positive aspects of the current system while minimiz-
ing other important commercial risks. 
b. The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may also not be 
natural advocates. They have made inroads towards increasing 
the transparency of the arbitration process and obtaining pub-
lic access to materials.268 Accordingly, some NGOs may be un-
willing to support reform that may decrease transparency if, for 
example, DSD results in the implementation of processes that 
increase confidentiality. 
However, opposition to DSD on the part of NGOs may be 
counterproductive to long-term goals.269 In particular, DSD 
may give NGOs a voice in the design process. Likewise, a new 
design may use processes that promote core NGO policy objec-
tives, such as establishing an ombuds office where citizens and 
NGOs have an equal opportunity to voice complaints.270 
 
 267. See Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. Mexico, Award (UNCITRAL 
Jan. 26, 2006), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ 
ThunderbirdAward.pdf (requiring Thunderbird to pay three-fourths (approx-
imately $378,939.06) of the tribunal’s costs and expenses and $1,126,549.38 
for the respondent’s legal costs and expenses); Methanex Corp. v. United 
States, 44 I.L.M. 1345, 1464 (2005) (requiring the losing investor to pay 
$2,989,423.76 for the United States’ legal costs and also reimburse the United 
States for $1,071,539.21 in connection with other arbitration costs); cf. ADC 
Affiliate Ltd. v. Republic of Hungary, No. ARB/03/1, Award (ICSID Oct. 2, 
2006), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ADCvHungaryAward.pdf 
(requiring the respondent to pay “to the Claimants the sum of $7,623,693 in 
full satisfaction of both Claimants’ claims for costs and expenses of this arbi-
tration”). 
 268. See supra note 196 (discussing aspects of improved transparency in 
the investment treaty arbitration process); see also 2004 U.S. Model BIT, su-
pra note 19, art. 29 (outlining various transparency provisions). 
 269. URY ET AL., supra note 65, at 101–06 (explaining the events that gave 
rise to a costly and lengthy dispute between management and the union). 
 270. See Krent, supra note 224, at 22 (observing that ombuds through their 
“interaction with members of the regulated public may help lend legitimacy 
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c. The Role of Governments 
More importantly, as they are signing treaties and are the 
quintessential “repeat players,” governments have not indi-
cated an interest in pursuing DSD. For example, when it re-
drafted its Model BIT in 2004, the United States government 
made certain structural changes.271 It did provide that “the 
claimant and respondent should initially seek to resolve the 
disputes through consultation and negotiation, which may in-
clude the use of nonbinding, third-party procedures.”272 There 
were many other useful improvements made to the dispute res-
olution provisions, but they were made primarily to the arbitra-
 
(as well as transparency) to the affairs of government” through their interac-
tions with members of the regulated public); cf. supra note 223 and accompa-
nying text (outlining the implications of an ombuds approach). 
 271. 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 19, art. 23 (emphasis added). Canada 
also amended its model investment treaty. See Agreement Between Canada 
and [Country] for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, http://www 
.international.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2007) [hereinafter Canada Model BIT]. 
 272. See 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 19, art. 23 (emphasis added). 
This was an improvement over Article VI of the 1992 U.S. Model BIT that 
provided that the “parties to the dispute should initially seek a resolution 
through consultation and negotiation” without specifying how this should 
happen; but in any event, after a six-month cooling-off period, parties could 
submit their disputes to arbitration. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 34, at 
247 (emphasis added). Under both versions, it is unclear what is expected of 
the parties during this process of consultation and negotiation. 
Recourse to negotiation does not appear to be mandatory. Instead, parties 
gain access to arbitration by (1) submitting a notice of intent to submit a claim 
and (2) waiting the requisite amount of time to file the arbitration. 2004 U.S. 
Model BIT, supra note 19, art. 24(2)–(3). The nature of the obligation to en-
gage in  nonbinding dispute resolution in U.S. Model BITs has ebbed and 
flowed over time. While the 2004 U.S. Model BIT generally resembles the 1987 
U.S. Model BIT language, the 1987 language was slightly stronger. The 1987 
U.S. Model BIT required that “parties to the dispute shall initially seek to re-
solve the dispute by consultation and negotiation, which may include the use 
of non-binding third party procedures.” U.S. BIT Model Negotiating Text of 
September 1987, art VI(2), reprinted in VANDEVELDE, supra note 217, app. A-
4. The 1982 version of the treaty provides that “the parties shall initially seek 
to resolve the dispute by consultation and negotiation [and] may agree to rely 
upon non-binding, third-party procedures, such as the fact-finding facility 
available under the Rules of the Additional Facility” of ICSID. U.S. BIT Model 
Negotiating Text of January 11, 1982, art. VI(2), reprinted in VANDEVELDE, 
supra note 217, app. A-1. By sharp contrast, the April 1994 version of the U.S. 
Model BIT did not reference any type of  nonbinding dispute resolution; it only 
permitted investors to resolve disputes in national tribunals, by previously 
agreed methods, and through various arbitration methods. See U.S. Model 
BIT, art. IX (Apr. 1994), reprinted in UNCTAD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
INSTRUMENTS: A COMPENDIUM VOL. III at 201, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DTC/30, 
U.N. Sales No. E.96.II.A.11 (1996). 
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tion process.273 More importantly, there is no known evidence 
regarding whether the United States considered DSD syste-
matically.274 
Governments may not be considering DSD for a variety of 
reasons. Some countries may not see a need to change. This 
may be due to practical realities, namely that their investors 
benefit from the current regime and their government has not 
had to absorb any of the costs of investment treaty arbitration 
because they have not (1) lost a case or (2) had to pay for the 
defense of a treaty claim.275 Other governments that have been 
regularly subjected to treaty claims and have had to pay the 
price—such as Argentina, the Czech Republic, and the 
Ukraine—may not have the bargaining power to change the 
status quo.276 
Basic reasons might explain the failure of governments to 
engage in DSD. Government officials may simply be unaware of 
DSD. Similarly, for those governments which have not used it 
in the past, there may be some skepticism as to its potential 
benefits or a lack of understanding of how it might be used in 
the framework of investor-state dispute resolution provisions of 
a treaty. Moreover, given the challenges of making changes 
within bureaucracies,277 inertia may prevent governmental 
change until a tipping point has been reached.278 
Despite these concerns, there are social, economic, and po-
litical costs of doing nothing. Engineers practicing Total Quali-
ty Control279 recognize that all systems have costs, including 
 
 273. The 2004 U.S. Model BIT gave tribunals the authority to accept ami-
cus curiae submissions, address preliminary questions, expand the transpa-
rency of arbitration proceedings, and consolidate claims. The 2004 Model BIT 
also considers the possibility of an appellate mechanism. 2004 U.S. Model BIT, 
supra note 19, arts. 28(3)–(4), 29, 33, Annex D. 
 274. Canada Model BIT, supra note 271, arts. 22–27, 32–39 (providing for 
consultation before the initiation of arbitration, introducing other improve-
ments to the arbitration system, but apparently failing to include DSD). 
 275. See, e.g., Gottwald, supra note 195, at 253 n.80 (“[The] United States 
has faced nine different investment treaty arbitration claims brought under 
NAFTA’s investment chapter, but has not lost a claim to date.”). 
 276. See supra notes 10, 193, 206, and accompanying text. 
 277. Cf. PAUL C. LIGHT, THICKENING GOVERNMENT: FEDERAL HIERARCHY 
AND THE DIFFUSION OF ACCOUNTABILITY 64 (1995) (arguing that the link be-
tween thickening government and the diffusion of accountability expresses it-
self in associated costs, including information distortion, administrative iner-
tia, and disunity of command). 
 278. See NEWTON, supra note 261, at 416. 
 279. Total Quality Control is a “comprehensive, companywide system” to 
achieve the goal of “provid[ing] a product and service into which quality is de-
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those for planning, appraisal, implementation, and failure.280 
Nevertheless, creating an effective high-quality system is well 
worth the effort if it eliminates other costs related to the crea-
tion of a poor quality product that may serve as the basis of fu-
ture complaint.281 
  CONCLUSION   
The goal of this Article has been to articulate the case for 
using DSD to analyze and manage investment-related conflict. 
This preliminary step is fundamental to providing a constitu-
ency and platform for dialogue about DSD in order to supply a 
framework for its ultimate implementation. It is, however, only 
one step in a larger process. 
It is imperative to engage in systems analysis to diagnose 
the investment treaty-related conflict and where the dispute 
resolution processes succeed and fail. Such an assessment 
might involve both quantitative and qualitative empirical anal-
ysis to understand the macro- and microimplications for future 
dispute resolution processes.282 In addition, it is vital to gather 
a constituency to agree on the core set of organizing principles. 
Bringing together states and investors, as well as international 
and non-governmental organizations, to create a dialogue may 
well prove a daunting task. This vital step is worth the effort 
because it could lead to a consensus on the appropriate frame-
work for the creation of future dispute resolution systems. It 
might, for example, determine whether predictability or frag-
mentation should be guiding principles of the system. 
Finally, governments might ultimately use the foregoing 
information and analysis to make innovations in or adaptations 
of their current processes for resolving investment treaty con-
flicts. Because not all governments are likely to accept this 
DSD-based approach to conflict management immediately,283 it 
 
signed, built, marketed, and maintained at the most economical costs which 
allow for full customer satisfaction.” A.V. FEIGENBAUM, TOTAL QUALITY CON-
TROL 5 (3d ed. 1991). 
 280. See generally BILL CREECH, THE FIVE PILLARS OF TQM: HOW TO MAKE 
TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT WORK FOR YOU (1994); FEIGENBAUM, supra 
note 279. 
 281. FEIGENBAUM, supra note 279; JURAN’S QUALITY HANDBOOK, supra 
note 120, at 8.1–8.25. 
 282. Quantitative analysis might include, for example, the use of regres-
sion modeling or other statistical techniques to analyze large bodies of data 
related to particular populations.  
 283. Everett Rogers’s classic book on the theory of diffusion of innovations 
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will be critical for governments that are perhaps more comfort-
able with experimentation and more familiar with DSD to in-
novate and provide an example of the costs and benefits of the 
approach.284 While innovation and diffusion are likely to be 
challenging, completion of the DSD process requires such de-
sign, implementation, and assessment of the design. Based 
upon the success of such innovators, there may be diffusion 
that encourages more risk-averse governments to use DSD in 
the future. 
The challenge is to think seriously about designing com-
prehensive systems to resolve investment disputes. This re-
quires consideration not just of traditional binding mechan-
isms, but of a system that may involve a combination of both 
binding and nonbinding processes. 
We are at a unique historical junction in the evolution of 
resolving investment-related conflict. Arbitration will no doubt 
be an important part of the puzzle. Nevertheless, taking a more 
systematic approach to conflict management provides an oppor-
tunity to assess and capitalize on the efficiency of different dis-
pute resolution options. Such an approach should include ongo-
ing scholarship and should address the issues identified in this 
preliminary work. The approach might also enhance the integ-
rity and legitimacy of the current dispute resolution system. 
As with any new venture, there will undoubtedly be chal-
lenges involved in integrating DSD into the world of invest-
ment treaty conflict. The goal should be to brainstorm possible 
opportunities before throwing the baby out with the proverbial 
bathwater. The opportunity to decrease costs, increase efficien-
cy, and interject procedural justice into the system should not 
be discounted. Ultimately, such an analysis has the unique 
benefit of strengthening the legitimacy of the dispute resolution 
 
argues that the adopters of any new innovation or idea could be categorized as 
“innovators” (2.5 percent), “early adopters” (13.5 percent), “early majority” (34 
percent), “late majority” (34 percent), and “laggards” (16 percent), based on 
bell curve mathematic distribution. EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNO-
VATION 11 (4th ed. 1995). The willingness and ability to adopt an innovation 
can depend on awareness, interest, evaluation, trial, and adoption. See id. at 1 
(“Getting a new idea adopted, even when it has obvious advantages, is often 
very difficult. Many innovations require a lengthy time, often of many years, 
from the time they become available to the time they are widely adopted.”); 
GLADWELL, supra note 49, at 197 (discussing the “New Product Cycle” and the 
role of “innovators” in encouraging people to adapt to new ideas). 
 284. Given its history of ADR and DSD and the ongoing debate about the 
Trade Promotion Authority Act, the United States is well positioned to consid-
er the use of DSD. 
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process and giving stakeholders confidence in the system’s ca-
pacity to protect their rights, satisfy their interests, and pro-
duce just results. 
